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ERISA requires that plan administrators provide consumers with understandable
health plan documents. The present study assessed the readability and comprehensibility
of medical necessity and claims procedure clauses. For Study 1, I collected 40 summary
plan descriptions from a diverse sample of employers and ran readability tests on the
medical necessity and claims procedure clauses. Scores on the Flesch Reading Ease,
Flesch Grade Level, and Fog Index indicated that the clauses were, in violation of
ERISA’s disclosure requirement, written at reading levels beyond those one might expect
the average plan participant to possess.
In Studies 2 and 3, employees read either original or redrafted versions of the
clauses that received low readability scores in Study 1. Participants completed a
comprehension test regarding the clauses. In both studies, participants’ overall
comprehension accuracy scores (.15 in Study 2 and .19 in Study 3) indicated that
participants did not understand the clauses. Contrary to hypotheses, participants who
received the redrafted versions of the clauses did not perform better on the

comprehension test than participants who received the original versions of the clauses
did.
In Study 3, employees read the clauses either as a reading-to-learn or a reading-todo task. Contrary to hypotheses, participants in the reading-to-do condition did not
perform better on the comprehension test than participants in the reading-to-learn
condition. The strength of the medical necessity claim also was manipulated in Study 3,
and participants were informed that coverage for a treatment they sought had been
denied. Consistent with hypotheses, participants were less likely to appeal a claim the
more they felt the health plan was procedurally fair and the more they were satisfied with
the health plan (ß=-.22, p<.001). In addition, participants were less likely to appeal a
claim the more they comprehended the health plan (ß = -.24, p < .01), especially when
they had a weak claim (ß=.21, p<.05), R2=.34, F(4, 204)=26.04, p<.001. Therefore,
better comprehension led to more appropriate appeal decisions. Findings from this study
have implications for enforcing ERISA’s disclosure requirement and for reducing
healthcare expenditures by reducing the number of lawsuits over plan coverage.
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1
Comprehension of Health Plan Language
for Denial of Benefit Claims
The federal government has elected to regulate the American healthcare industry
primarily through informing consumers of their rights and obligations regarding
healthcare coverage (Sage, 1999; Sage, 2003). By requiring healthcare insurers and
providers to disclose material information to patients, the federal government has
attempted to increase consumer knowledge while protecting America’s commitment to
patient autonomy and self-determination (Sage, 1999). Disclosure requirements,
however, cannot have their intended consequences unless consumers can understand and
implement the information they receive.
The present study explored consumers’ comprehension of their rights regarding
denied healthcare benefits, which are governed by the disclosure requirements and civil
enforcement mechanisms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In
Study 1, health plan documents distributed to employees of large corporations and
documents received by plaintiffs in recent litigation concerning denied benefits were
collected and submitted to readability formulas. In Study 2, employees were tested on
their comprehension of their ERISA rights after reading either an original or redrafted
version of plan documents. In Study 3, employees read plan documents either without
any a priori knowledge or knowing they had been denied coverage. Again consumers
were tested on their comprehension of their rights after reading plan documents, and they
assessed the fairness of the appeal process.
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ERISA
Approximately 63% of the population receive their healthcare benefits from
employer-sponsored healthcare plans according to 2001 U.S. Census data. In recognition
of the growing number and economic impact of employee benefit plans, Congress
enacted ERISA in 1974 to regulate employee pension benefit plans and employee welfare
benefit plans, which include employer-sponsored healthcare plans (29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461). According to ERISA § 2(b), one of the purposes of ERISA is to protect the
interests of heathcare plan participants and beneficiaries by requiring the disclosure of
information and providing adequate remedies.
ERISA’s Disclosure Requirements. ERISA § 102(a) requires that plan
administrators provide plan participants and beneficiaries with a summary plan
description (SPD) of the employee benefit plan. Accordingly, the SPD “shall be written
in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be
sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan” (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)). Plans
may have a difficult time drafting SPDs because the documents must serve two
conflicting purposes (Eddy, 1996). Because the SPD must inform plan participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and responsibilities regarding their healthcare plan, it must be
precise, which implies that it should be a technical and comprehensive description.
However, the SPD also must be comprehensible to plan participants and beneficiaries,
which suggests that it should be free of jargon and be as concise as possible. One
problem with SPDs is that it may be difficult for plan administrators to communicate
effectively through a written document alone the information necessary for participants to
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make informed healthcare decisions (Medill, Wiener, Bornstein, & McGorty, 2006; U.S.
Department of Labor, 2005).
The SPD typically explains, in three main sections, what benefits will be covered
(Eddy, 1996). The first section, often referred to as coverage categories, identifies the
broad categories of services that the plan will cover (e.g., inpatient hospital services and
maternal care). The second section, coverage stipulations, explains whether participants
will have to share any of the costs of the services and how long they can utilize the
services. The third section, often referred to as coverage criteria, attempts to distinguish
between the particular services that will be covered within a coverage category and those
services that will not be covered. Within their coverage criteria, SPDs often inform
participants that the healthcare plan will only cover or reimburse care that is “medically
necessary,” a term of art in health insurance contracts (Bergthold, 1995; Hall &
Anderson, 1992). To determine whether plan administrators meet their obligations to
make SPDs understandable to the average plan participant, selected clauses from actual
SPDs were submitted to readability formulas in Study 1.
Medical Necessity. Medical necessity provisions are the primary legal
mechanism health plans use to limit the services they will cover to beneficial and costeffective treatments (Eddy, 1996). Although medical necessity provisions inform plan
participants and beneficiaries about what types of care will be covered (i.e., treatment
deemed medically necessary), they often fail to define or describe the process or criteria
used to make the determination (Bergthold, 1995; Singer & Bergthold, 2001). According
to Sage (2003), health plans use such broad terms as medical necessity in health
insurance policies “partly from the belief among both insurers and regulators that
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unsophisticated consumers are incapable of understanding more detailed contractual
provisions” (p. 637).
Although no research has examined consumers’ abilities to understand medical
necessity clauses, interviews with consumer representatives and their treating physicians
revealed dissatisfaction with the amount, clarity, utility, and accessibility of information
disclosed (Singer & Bergthold, 2001). Medical necessity disputes are frequently
characterized by inconsistent administration and poor communication (Sage, 2003;
Singer & Bergthold, 2001). Consumers and policymakers rated improving
communication as the most effective and feasible recommendation for improving medical
necessity practices (Singer & Bergthold, 2001). Problems obtaining care that Medicaid
enrollees or their physicians believed was medically necessary was one of the most
frequent complaints in the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey (Venus, Rector,
& Shah, 2003). The three sampled health plans received poorer scores on the survey
when enrollees reported problems obtaining care that they believed was medically
necessary. For two of the three plans, enrollees reported problems obtaining care
believed medically necessary significantly more often when they did not find or
understand written information from the plan, as compared to when they did find or
understand the written information.
A few studies have explored the prevalence and characteristics of medical
necessity appeals. In one study, archival analysis of appeals to employer-sponsored
healthcare plans revealed that 11% of retrospective appeals (i.e., appeals concerning
denial of reimbursement for services already obtained) and 49% of prospective appeals
(i.e., appeals concerning denials of access to services) involved medical necessity
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disputes (Gresenz, Studdert, Campbell, & Hensler, 2002). In retrospective appeals, plan
participants or beneficiaries sought treatment that a utilization review already had
determined was medically unnecessary. Prospective appeals primarily addressed whether
a treatment should be covered at all, whether an alternative or more conservative
treatment should be tried first, or whether the duration or intensity of the treatment was
clinically sufficient.
In another study, 37% of prospective appeals involved medical necessity disputes,
and 52% of those denials were reversed (Studdert & Gresenz, 2003). Nearly 30% of the
appeals dealt with surgical procedures (mostly gastric bypass, breast alteration, and
removal of varicose veins), 24% concerned office consultations with specialists (mostly
dermatologists, orthopedic surgeons, and psychiatrists), 20% regarded diagnostic tests
(mostly magnetic resonance imaging, bone density, and sleep studies), and 12% involved
disputes over denied treatment for scars or benign lesions. Therefore, most medical
necessity disputes concerned cosmetic or nonessential treatments. Due to the vague and
ambiguous nature of medical necessity and evidence that it leads to disputes (Bergthold,
1995; Sage, 2003; Singer & Bergthold, 2001), the present study focused on
comprehension of this provision in SPDs. In Studies 2 and 3, a medical necessity dispute
led to the opportunity to exercise ERISA civil enforcement rights through a prospective
appeal.
ERISA’s Civil Enforcement Mechanism. If the plan administrator denies a claim
for benefits, under ERISA § 503 the plan administrator must provide the plan participant
or beneficiary with adequate notice in writing, “setting forth the specific reasons for such
denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant.” Singer and
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Bergthold (2001) examined denial letters and found them lacking information regarding
who made the decision, what reasons they had for the decision, what evidence they
considered for the decision, and what policies they applied toward the decision.
Interviewed consumers believed that more informative denial letters would increase
public trust in managed care.
ERISA § 503 also requires that healthcare plans establish a reasonable procedure
to review participants’ and beneficiaries’ appeals of denied benefits (29 U.S.C. § 1133).
A plan’s SPD explains these procedures to participants and beneficiaries. Research
indicates that employer-sponsored health plans adjudicate approximately 250,000 appeals
annually (Gresenz et al., 2002). Most plans require that a plan participant or beneficiary
must exhaust the plan’s internal appeal procedures before they can seek external review
(Gresenz et al., 2002). It is imperative that plan participants and beneficiaries understand
the internal review process for two reasons. First, courts may dismiss claims with
prejudice due to failure to exhaust the plan’s administrative appeal procedure (Harrow v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 2002; Diaz v. United Agricultural Employee Welfare Benefit Plan &
Trust, 1995). Second, judges are generally limited to reviewing the documents that the
plan administrators had before them at the time of the benefit denial (Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 1989). Because internal appeal procedures have implications on
later lawsuits, the present study assessed the point in the process at which participants
believe they should seek out legal advice. Stolle and Slain (1997) found that when asked
what they would do if they were harmed as a result of a contracted for service, 46% of
undergraduate participants would seek legal advice and 29% would handle the situation
themselves. SPDs are similar to contracts because they outline the terms of an agreement
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between two parties, the plan administrator and the plan participant. As a result, ERISA
statutes and litigation are driven by contract law principles.
In an effort to ensure that health plans are medically justified in denying benefits,
41 states and the District of Columbia require that health plans submit their denied claims
to independent external review (Mariner, 2002). Because state laws vary on several
dimensions (e.g., what rules the reviewers must use and whether the reviewers’ decisions
are binding), they are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the present study focused
on the federal mechanism for enforcing plan benefits. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) allows
healthcare plan participants and beneficiaries to bring civil suits against their plan
administrators to recover benefits due to them under the terms of the plan, to enforce their
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify their rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.
ERISA litigation, which often favors the health plan administrator over the plan
participant, is premised on the assumption that plan participants and beneficiaries
comprehend the information they receive in the SPD and, as a result, know their rights
regarding their health plan. The present study examined whether this presumption is
valid. Recent ERISA litigation suggests that the written language of many SPDs may be
inadequate to satisfy the legal standard for participant understanding established under
ERISA (Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 2004; Pegram v. Herdrich, 2000; Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 2002). One of the underlying policy considerations for ERISA’s
disclosure requirements is that well-informed employees can more effectively protect
their rights to plan benefits. However, if SPDs are written above the reading ability of
the average plan participant, this objective cannot be met. The present study not only

8
determined the readability and comprehensibility of SPDs but also whether the
comprehensibility of SPDs influenced participants’ decisions to exercise their right to
appeal coverage denials.
Comprehension
Research suggests individuals do not always read legal documents, and one of the
self-reported reasons individuals sign legal documents without reading them first is their
perception that the documents are too difficult to understand (Wogalter, Howe, Sifuentes,
& Luginbuhl, 1999). A national survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates (1995)
of 1,081 adults found that half of the insured respondents either did not read or merely
skimmed materials about their health plans (as cited by Isaacs, 1996). Although getting
consumers to read documents governed by ERISA is critical, the present study focused
on the average person’s ability to comprehend those documents if he or she did read
them.
According to the text comprehension theory of van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), there
are three levels of comprehension. The most superficial level of comprehension is called
the surface structure; at this level, individuals encode words and phrases and the
linguistic relations between them. Comprehension of the textbase involves encoding the
semantic and rhetorical structure of the text. The deepest level of comprehension is
called the situation model. At this level, individuals use their prior knowledge to
elaborate on information provided by the text, and they integrate the new information into
their existing knowledge base. The completeness of the situation model determines
whether an individual merely will have memory for the text or actually will learn from
the text (Kintsch, 1994). Whereas text memory means one can reproduce the text in some
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form, text learning means one can apply the information from the text to a novel
situation.. In Studies 2 and 3, participants read medical necessity and claims procedure
clauses extracted from SPDs to form a hypothetical health plan. They completed a
multiple-choice comprehension test on the clauses. This exercise in comprehension was
designed to assess participants’ text memory of information provided by a health plan.
Because plan participants and beneficiaries may read their SPDs only when they
first receive them or after a dispute occurs, the present study examined comprehension
under both circumstances. In doing research on readability and comprehension in
general, Duffy and Kabance (1982) distinguished between two types of reading tasks. In
a reading-to-learn task, individuals attempt to store and retain information for use in the
future. Thus, when plan participants and beneficiaries read their SPDs when they first
receive them, they are engaging in a reading-to-learn task. On the other hand, in a
reading-to-do task, individuals read with specific objectives and plan to use their newlyacquired information immediately. Plan participants and beneficiaries engage in readingto-do tasks when they revisit their SPDs once a dispute has arisen. In the present study,
all participants engaged in a reading-to-learn task regarding portions of a SPD in Study 2.
In Study 3, half the participants engaged in a reading-to-learn task and the other half
engaged in a simulated reading-to-do task regarding portions of a SPD. In the reading-todo task, participants were instructed that their health plan had determined care they had
requested was not medically necessary. Because reading-to-do tasks should prompt
individuals to pay greater attention to relevant information, process information more
selectively, and engage in deeper integration of information (Duffy & Kabance, 1982), I
expected comprehension would be better when participants had a priori knowledge that
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benefits had been denied. Whereas the reading-to-learn task may only result in text
memory, the reading-to-do task should encourage text learning. Text learning requires
deeper understanding of the subject matter so that individuals can use newly acquired
information in novel environments (Kintsch, 1994). As a result, participants in the
reading-to-do task should be better at using the health plan language to answer the
multiple-choice question comprehension test.
Health Information and Individual Differences. In general, legal documents tend
to be difficult to read due to their length, complexity, and technical nature (Hartley, 2000;
Wogalter et al., 1999). Documents governed by ERISA may be particularly hard to
comprehend due to the technical nature of healthcare information (Sage, 1999). In an
effort to control healthcare spending, the health insurance industry has turned to
consumer-driven healthcare (Robinson, 2004). This movement has shifted significantly
more responsibility to plan participants for decisions concerning the utilization of
healthcare services. Plan participants may find it more difficult to navigate consumerdriven healthcare plans than traditional healthcare plans, and they may find it more
difficult to understand the benefits covered by their plans and the rights and
responsibilities they have under their plans (Medill et al., 2006). Indeed, studies show
that a high percentage of Americans do not understand how healthcare plans operate,
which might be a prerequisite for understanding more detailed processes such as benefit
denials (Edgman-Levitan & Cleary, 1996; Hibbard & Jewett, 1997; Hibbard, Jewett,
Englemann, & Tusker, 1998; Isaacs, 1996; Lubalin & Harris-Kojetin, 1999; McCormack
et al., 2002). In addition, consumer-driven healthcare presumes that plan participants will
use their health plan documents as a tool for medical decision making, but only four to
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six percent of health plan participants trust their healthcare plan to provide the kind of
information (e.g., the cost and quality of providers) they need to make informed decisions
about the utilization of healthcare services (EBRI/Commonwealth Fund, 2005). Plan
participants may be skeptical of the information provided by their health plans due, in
part, to their inability to comprehend health plan documents, such as SPDs (Medill et al.,
2006).
Furthermore, consumers may struggle to comprehend health information due to
their underlying characteristics (Sage, 1999). Several studies have found that consumers’
knowledge of health insurance varies depending on individual characteristics. Greater
knowledge of health insurance has been associated with higher education (Cafferata,
1984; Hibbard et al., 1998; Lambert, 1980; Marquis, 1983; McCall, Rice, & Sangl, 1986;
McCormack et al., 2002), higher income (Hibbard et al., 1998; Lambert, 1980; Marquis,
1983; McCall et al., 1986; McCormack et al., 2002; Rice, McCall, & Boismier, 1991),
younger age (Cafferata, 1984; Lambert, 1980; McCall et al., 1986), being White
(Marquis, 1983; McCall et al., 1986; McCormack et al., 2002), and being male (Lambert,
1980; McCormack et al., 2002). As a result, the present study asked participants to report
their demographic information. In addition, experience with the healthcare industry may
influence understanding of how health plans operate. Hibbard and Jewett (1996) suggest
that the chronically or severely ill may assess healthcare services differently from healthy
consumers. Consequently, the present study assessed participants’ experience with the
healthcare industry.
Perhaps more central to issues of comprehension, individuals may differ in their
health literacy. Functional health literacy measures consumer ability to read and
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understand health information (Andrus & Roth, 2002). Over 30% of English-speaking
Americans have inadequate or marginal health literacy as measured by the Test of
Functional Health Literacy in Adults (TOFHLA) or the Short Test of Functional Health
Literacy in Adults (S-TOFHLA; Gazmararian et al., 1999; Gazmararian, Williams, Peel,
& Baker, 2003; Parker & Gazmararian, 2003; Williams et al., 1995). For example, a
study assessing health literacy found that as many as 60% of consumers could not
understand standard consent forms for medical procedures (Williams et al., 1995). The
Ad Hoc Committee on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs (1999)
conducted a comprehensive search of the health literacy literature. Their research
indicates that even when controlling for such factors as education level and
socioeconomic status, inadequate health literacy is associated with inferior understanding
of health-related information along with worse health, less use of preventative health
services, and inflated healthcare costs. The wide assortment of available health
information, including SPDs, cannot have its intended effect of informing and protecting
consumers if consumers lack the health literacy necessary to comprehend it (Bernhardt &
Cameron, 2003). The present study assessed the health literacy of a population of
employed adults and determined whether their health literacy related to their
comprehension of SPDs.
Readability of Healthcare Information. One measure of comprehension is
readability assessments. Readability assessments can be used to show that drafters are
overestimating document readability (Hochhauser, 1999). Gray, Cooke, and
Tannenbaum (1978) found over 77% of 1526 research consent forms, as measured by the
widely-used Flesch readability formula, were written at the academic or scientific level.
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Several studies have examined the readability of medical consent forms. A study of 60
medical consent forms found that the average readability of the forms was only slightly
lower than readability scores for scientific medical journals, as measured by the Flesch
readability formula, and that 61% of the forms required college-level reading ability, as
measured by the Fry Readability Scale (Morrow, 1980). Another study found that the
mean reading level of 88 medical consent forms, as measured by the Fry Readability
Scale, was 13.4 years of schooling (LoVerde, Prochazka, & Byyny, 1989).
The present study assessed readability scores for SPD sections on medical
necessity and claims procedure. Based on assessments of medical consent forms and
surveys of plan participants, I expected to find that SPDs were written above the reading
levels the average plan participant is likely to possess. A search of 61 institutional review
board websites found that specific readability standards for medical consent forms ranged
from 5th- to 10th-grade reading levels (Paasche-Orlow, Taylor, & Brancati, 2003). A
finding that SPDs require high levels of reading ability could be problematic given the
National Adult Literacy Survey’s finding that 20 to 23% of the 191 million adults
sampled were functionally illiterate and another 26% had marginal reading skills (Kirsh,
Jungeblut, Jenkins, & Kolstad, 1993). According to 2005 U.S. Census data, 16% of
adults age 25 or older have not graduated from high school.
Declarative and Procedural Knowledge. The present study not only assessed the
readability of a sample of medical necessity and claims procedure clauses but also
directly measured comprehension by assessing health consumers’ knowledge after
reading those clauses. Little research has examined participants’ comprehension of their
legal rights based on written documents. Morton and Green (1991) evaluated children’s
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and adolescents’ comprehension of terminology related to their rights as inpatients by
having participants define vocabulary words, paraphrase statements, and determine
whether paraphrased statements were accurate. Comprehension was related to abstract
reasoning ability, decision-making ability, intelligence, and age. Tymchuk, Ouslander,
and Rader (1986) had elderly residents of a long-term care facility read or listen to
versions of a resident’s bill of rights and evaluate whether rights were erroneously denied
or correctly claimed. Participants who received the simplified language version of the
bill of rights demonstrated better comprehension than participants who received the large
print, storybook, or videotape versions. The present study is the first to research plan
participants’ comprehension of their ERISA rights. Based on research concerning health
insurance knowledge and comprehension of informed consent forms, I expected to find
that participants’ comprehension was low.
Because readability scores do not always accurately predict objective
comprehension (Black, 1981; Duffy & Kabance, 1982), the present study directly
measured comprehension by assessing health consumers’ knowledge of their rights after
reading SPDs. Several studies have examined comprehension of jury instructions and
suggest a methodology for evaluating comprehension of other legal documents (Wiener,
Pritchard, & Weston, 1995; Wiener et al., 1998; Wiener et al., 2004). Smith (1994)
examines two types of knowledge—declarative knowledge, which is meaning- and
content-based information stored as semantic concepts, schemata, scripts, or prototypes,
and procedural knowledge, which operates on the declarative knowledge stored in longand short-term memory. Wiener et al. (1998, 2004) assessed these two types of
knowledge in an effort to gain a more complete understanding of comprehension of jury
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instructions. Declarative knowledge was measured by questioning participants about
legal concepts, terms, definitions, and rules outlined in the jury instructions. Procedural
knowledge was measured by asking participants to determine whether a hypothetical
juror followed the jury instructions given the hypothetical facts of a case. The present
study assessed participants’ declarative and procedural knowledge of their benefits and
their rights and responsibilities after reading documents governed by ERISA. Because
declarative knowledge is memory for meaning- and content-based information, it is
similar to text memory, which simply involves reproduction of text in some form
(Kintsch, 1994). Procedural knowledge, on the other hand, is similar to text learning
because it involves applying stored information in a novel way. Thus, procedural
knowledge may require a deeper level of comprehension than declarative knowledge.
Improving Comprehension. Due to complaints that legal documents are difficult
to read and comprehend, several states have taken steps to promote the incorporation of
plain language into legal documents (Black, 1981; Wogalter et al., 1999). For example,
researchers have demonstrated that the comprehension of jury instructions can be
improved through redrafting (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977,
1982). Research focused on insurance information and informed consent forms may
provide insight into ways to improve the comprehensibility of SPDs. Researchers were
able to improve Medicare beneficiaries’ knowledge of their healthcare coverage by
supplying beneficiaries with a Medicare & You handbook (McCormack et al., 2001;
McCormack et al., 2002). Harris-Kojetin, McCormack, Jael, Sangl, and Garfinkel (2001)
interviewed and conducted focus groups with publicly- and privately-insured consumers
to gather suggestions for improving the comprehensibility of several insurance booklets.
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They found that consumers wanted the insurance materials to be shorter, simpler, and
clearer.
Several studies have attempted to improve the comprehensibility of informed
consent forms. Young, Hooker, and Freeberg (1990) found that individuals scored higher
on a multiple-choice comprehension test when a research consent form was written at a
lower reading level as compared to a higher reading level. The high reading level
consent form, which required grade level 16 reading ability, was reduced to the sixthgrade level, as measured by the Flesch-Kincaid readability formula, by using words with
fewer syllables, less technical jargon, and fewer complex sentences. Participants who
received the low reading level version reported that the consent form was easier to
understand than participants who received the high reading level version. Holding
reading level constant, shortening and removing detail from consent forms also has
improved their comprehension (Mann, 1984). Masson and Waldron (1994) increased
comprehension of several standard legal documents (e.g., mortgages and bank loans) by
removing or replacing archaic words and legal terms and simplifying sentence structure.
In a series of experiments, Wogalter et al. (1999) examined factors related to the
comprehension of legal documents. Participants in the first two studies suggested and
rated highly the following recommendations for improving comprehension of legal
documents: decreasing technicality, giving explanations, providing definitions, and
giving examples. Wogalter et al. were able to improve comprehension and readability of
a conventional consent form by enlarging the print, shortening the length, changing the
tone from third to first person, and reducing the technical nature of the document.
Participants who received the improved consent form, as compared to the conventional
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form, reported that they read it more carefully, understood the form better, and were more
informed about their rights. These participant perceptions were correlated with their
objective comprehension.
The present study incorporated the mechanisms employed by Wogalter et al.
(1999) to improve comprehension of SPD provisions. Based on the success of redrafting
other legal documents, I expected to find that participants would demonstrate greater
comprehension of health plan requirements and ERISA rights when they read a redrafted,
as compared to an original, SPD. Based on Duffy and Kabance’s (1982) reasoning that
redrafting facilitates comprehension only when readers are required to integrate and
organize the information (i.e., when they must summarize the information or when they
must apply a procedure) and because appealing benefit denials is a procedural process, I
expected comprehension to improve more when participants engaged in a reading-to-do
task (i.e., when they knew a benefit had been denied) as opposed to a reading-to-learn
task.
One of the policy considerations underlying ERISA’s disclosure requirement is to
make employers and insurers who sponsor plans feel more accountable for their
compliance with ERISA and the terms of their plans. Employers and plan administrators
may be motivated to improve the comprehension of their SPDs if plan participants and
beneficiaries’ decisions to appeal coverage denials are influenced by their knowledge of
their rights according to the terms of their healthcare plans. Increased comprehension
could lead to fewer appeals because participants would know what to and what not to
expect from their plan administrators. On the other hand, increased comprehension could
lead to more appeals because participants would be better equipped to begin the appeal

18
process. In Study 3, participants reacted to being denied healthcare benefits they sought
from a hypothetical health plan. I expected comprehension to influence participants’
decisions to appeal benefit denials, such that participants would make sounder appeal
decisions the more they understood the health plan. Whereas the multiple-choice
comprehension test was designed to assess participants’ text memory, the simulated
appeals process was designed to assess participants’ text learning of the information
provided by a health plan (Kintsch, 1994). The appeals process required participants to
apply information they read from the health plan to the novel situation of challenging the
health plan’s decision. Thus, successful completion of the appeals process may require a
deeper understanding of the material than successful completion of the comprehension
test. The strength of the medical necessity claim was manipulated. Participants either
had a strong or weak claim for appealing the health plan’s decision to deny benefits. I
hypothesized that better comprehension would be associated with an increased propensity
to appeal a strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a weak claim.
Plan Satisfaction. The decision to appeal benefit denials may be mediated not
only by comprehension of SPDs but also by satisfaction with the plan. According to
Sage (2003), “Public trust in the health care system has collective importance, and fair
deliberative procedures reassure individuals as consumers, patients, and citizens that
health plans, even as private actors, are seeking a reasonable balance between access to
(or quality of) health care and its costs” (p. 621-622). Procedural justice concerns the
fairness of the process used to come to a decision (Tyler, 1989). The present study
focused on participants’ satisfaction with the health plan and with the ERISA appeals
process.

19
Because healthcare plans follow a procedure for denying benefits, studies on
procedural fairness may provide insight into perceptions of health plans and the claims
denial process. Lind and Tyler (1988) proposed that reactions to decisions are influenced
by perceptions of procedural fairness, independent of outcomes. Control, neutrality,
social standing, and trust influence perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler, 1989).
Control indicates that each side had an influence on the decision, neutrality occurs when
decisions are made in an unbiased manner, trust depends on the relationship between the
individual and the authority figure making the decision, and social standing reflects an
individual’s assessment of their status in the group. Tyler (1989) suggests that
individuals will perceive decisions as fairer when they have some choice and voice in the
decision-making process.
Hughes and Larson (1991) extended the principle of procedural fairness to the
healthcare setting. Participants rated the procedural fairness of prescription selection
when a physician either asked or failed to ask a patient’s preferences regarding several
characteristics of the medication. Hughes and Larson found that participants rated the
prescription decision as more fair when the patient was given the chance to voice his
preferences, independent of the outcome of the decision.
Murphy-Berman, Cross, and Fondacaro (1999) asked adults enrolled in health
plans to recall a time over the past 12 months when their healthcare administrator made a
decision regarding the care they were able to receive. After describing this experience,
respondents reported their perceptions of the procedural fairness of the situation.
Respondents who rated the situation as more procedurally fair expected to have a better
relationship with their health plan administrator, to have a closer relationship with their
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health plan group, to have more status in their health plan group, and to feel better about
themselves.
To improve participant satisfaction with their health plans, the Ethical
Fundamental Obligations Report Card Evaluations program suggests that coverage
decisions ought to be transparent, participatory, equitable and consistent, sensitive to
value, and compassionate (Wynia et al., 2004). Research suggests that individuals are
more likely to accept undesirable outcomes when they perceive the process that generated
the outcomes as fair (Lind & Tyler, 1988). If individuals perceive a decision-making
process as unfair, they may be more likely to take action against the decision. Skarlicki
and Folger (1997) investigated the relationship between workers’ perceptions of
procedural fairness and organizational retaliation behavior. They found that perceptions
of procedural fairness did not influence claiming behavior. In a study of workers’
compensation claims, Roberts and Markel (2001) assessed perceptions of fairness shortly
after company physicians reported an injury and one year later. Again, perceptions of
procedural fairness did not influence claiming behavior.
The present study determined whether this finding extended to the decision to file
ERISA denial of benefit claims. Perhaps, procedural fairness factors relate to perceptions
of procedural fairness but do not predict behavior. The present study measured both
perceptions of procedural fairness and appeal behavior. In spite of Skarlicki and Folger’s
results and Roberts and Markel’s findings, I expected participants to appeal denials more
often when they perceived the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and
reported being less satisfied with the health plan. In addition, I expected comprehension
to influence participants’ perceptions of the health plan, but it was unclear in which
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direction. Increased comprehension could lead to greater plan approval because
participants would know what to and what not to expect from their plan administrators.
On the other hand, increased comprehension could lead to more dissatisfaction because
participants would realize the limitations of the health plan coverage and the
administrative obstacles they would have to overcome to get the results they wanted.
Present Study
The present study explored consumers’ comprehension of their benefits and their
rights and responsibilities regarding denied healthcare benefits and investigated
consumers’ perceptions of fairness and decision preferences in hypothetical situations
where coverage had been denied. In Study 1, the medical necessity and claims procedure
clauses of SPDs were analyzed using readability formulas. Based on assessments of
medical consent forms, I expected to find that these SPD clauses were written at reading
levels beyond those one might expect the average plan participant to possess.
In Study 2, employees were tested on their comprehension of their rights after
reading either original or redrafted versions of medical necessity and claims procedure
clauses. Participants also completed a health literacy test and reported their personal
health history and insurance status. I hypothesized that employees with higher health
literacy and more experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate greater
comprehension than employees with lower health literacy and less familiarity with the
healthcare industry. More importantly, I expected to find that participants who received
the redrafted clauses would demonstrate better comprehension than participants who
received the original clauses would.
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In Study 3, employees either read plan documents without any a priori knowledge
(reading-to-learn) or knowing they had been denied coverage (reading-to-do). Claim
strength was manipulated as well. Participants were tested on their comprehension of
their rights after reading plan documents, and they reported their satisfaction with the
health plan and the appeals process. I expected comprehension to be better for the
redrafted clauses, as compared to the original clauses, and for the reading-to-do task, as
compared to the reading-to-learn task. I also expected comprehension, perceptions of
fairness, and the strength of the claim to predict the decision to appeal. I hypothesized
that better comprehension would be associated with an increased propensity to appeal a
strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a weak claim. I also expected
participants to appeal the plan administrator’s decision more often when they perceived
the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and when they were less satisfied
with the health plan.
Study 1
Method
Materials. As part of a larger project (Medill et al., 2006) that examined six types
of clauses in SPDs, I collected and tested the medical necessity and claims procedure
clauses from 40 health plan SPDs. The study sample included a diverse geographic range
of employers from across the United States. Both large employers and small employers
representing a variety of industrial sectors were included in the study sample. The study
sample included both healthcare plans sponsored by a single employer for its workers and
multiemployer healthcare plans sponsored jointly by employers and labor unions for
collective bargaining unit employees. The study sample also included different types of
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healthcare plans, including traditional indemnity healthcare plans offered through
insurance companies, employer self-insured healthcare plans with a third party
administrator and a utilization review manager, managed care plans, and one highdeductible healthcare plan with a corresponding health savings account feature.
The majority of the SPDs were obtained by conducting a random search of the
internet. SPDs also were obtained from employees who participated in plans. A few of
the SPDs were obtained from attorneys who had represented plan participants in recent
federal court litigation where the language of the SPD was related to the issue in dispute.
Procedure. Two experts in ERISA coded each SPD. A law school professor with
a combined total of fourteen years of private legal practice and academic research
experience with ERISA coded all of the SPDs in the sample. Three other expert readers,
with 3.5 to 6 years of private legal practice experience with ERISA, each coded a portion
of the entire sample set of SPDs. All four coders are considered experts on ERISAregulated healthcare plans by their peers in the legal profession.
Each expert reader received a detailed coding instruction book (see Appendix A
for general and specific instructions for the medical necessity and claims procedure
clauses) that outlined the criteria for the reader to use in determining what language in the
SPD should be identified as part of a clause. The coding instruction book included the
legal definition and function of the clause along with appropriate citations to the relevant
statutory provisions of ERISA. The coding instruction book gave specific guidance to
the expert readers regarding what language should be included as part of the clause. The
coding instruction book also told the expert readers what language should be excluded
from relevant clauses when appropriate.
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I assessed the readability of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses
that were identified by the expert readers. Because all of the readers are considered
experts on ERISA-regulated healthcare plans, any language that was identified by an
expert reader as part of a tested clause was subjected to a readability assessment. This
procedure guaranteed that the portions of the SPDs that were analyzed for readability
were maximally inclusive and did not depend on the judgments of a single expert reader.
Inter-rater reliability. However, I did calculate inter-rater agreement among the
expert coders. The primary coder served as the standard for calculating agreement with
each of the three secondary coders. I computed agreement as the number of paragraphs
that both raters marked off for a given clause, divided by the total number of paragraphs
that either coder marked as part of that clause. To illustrate this procedure, assume that
the first expert reader identified 10 paragraphs as constituting a claims procedure clause
and the second expert reader identified 9 paragraphs. The two expert readers agreed
upon 8 paragraphs (i.e., they both marked off the same 8 paragraphs), but they disagreed
on three others. For this clause, the inter-rater agreement would equal 8/11, or 72%. If
the coders agreed that a particular plan lacked any relevant clause, agreement was
assigned a value of 100% for this analysis.
For medical necessity clauses, inter-rater reliability ignoring differences across
SPDs in the number of observed paragraphs was 42% (SD = 31%) and inter-rater
reliability weighing the number of observed paragraphs was 31%. For claims procedure
clauses, inter-rater reliability ignoring differences in the number of observed paragraphs
was 83% (SD = 24%) and inter-rater reliability weighing the number of observed
paragraphs was 85%. Although medical necessity clauses were substantially more
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difficult to identify reliably than claims procedure clauses, these results indicate that
overall even trained ERISA experts struggle to reliably determine the language in SPDs
that describes the benefits covered by the plan and the participant’s rights and
responsibilities under the plan (Medill et al., 2006). As described above, to maximize
inclusiveness, any language that was identified by an expert reader as part of a tested
clause was included in the readability analysis.
Measures. The medical necessity and claims procedure clauses were submitted to
three widely used readability measures: the Flesch Reading Ease formula, Flesch Grade
Level formula, and Fog Index. The Flesch Reading Ease formula yields a readability
score between 0 and 100 with lower scores indicating the material is more difficult to
comprehend (Flesch, 1948). The formula for the Flesch Reading Ease score takes into
account average sentence length and average number of syllables per word. The resulting
scores are associated with grade levels (e.g., 0-30 = college graduates; 30-50 = college
years; 50-60 = 10th-12th graders). The related Flesch Grade Level indicates the minimum
education level required for the reader to be able to understand the document (Kincaid,
Fishbume, Rogers, & Chissom, 1975). The formula for the Flesch Grade Level is also
based on average sentence length and average number of syllables per word. The Flesch
Grade Level formula uses different coefficients from the Flesch Reading Ease Formula,
and the output is stated in terms of grade level. The Fog Index uses different indicators to
measure language complexity. The Fog Index weighs the total number of words, words
of three or more syllables, and sentences (Gunning, 1968). Commentary accompanying
the Fog Index recommends that technical material should score no higher than 14,
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business material should score no higher than 12, and clerical material should score no
higher than 8 (Thomas, Hartley, & Kincaid, 1975).
Results and Discussion
The results of the readability analyses are set forth in Table 1 for the medical
necessity clauses and Table 2 for the claims procedure clauses.

Table 1. Average Objective Readability of Medical Necessity Clauses
M

SD

Range

Flesch Reading Ease

32.4

7.8

15-50

Flesch Grade Level

13.0

1.8

9.9-17.2

FOG Index

16.0

2.1

10.9-20.9

Table 2. Average Objective Readability of Claims Procedure Clauses
M

SD

Range

Flesch Reading Ease

47.6

8.3

31-65

Flesch Grade Level

11.3

2.1

7.4-16.4

FOG Index

13.9

2.2

9.7-18.9

Consistent with assessments of medical consent forms, I found that both types of
clauses were written at reading levels beyond those one might expect the average plan
participant to possess. The Flesch Reading Ease mean of 32.4 for medical necessity and
47.6 for claims procedure indicates that the language of the clauses tested is written at a
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college reading level. The related Flesch Grade Level indicates that the minimum
education level required for the reader to be able to understand the language of the
average clause is 13.0 for medical necessity and 11.3 for claims procedure (with 12 being
equivalent to a high school degree). The Fog Index mean of 16.0 for medical necessity
and 13.9 for claims procedure is at or higher than the recommended level for technical
material (14) and higher than the recommended level for business material (12; Thomas
et al., 1975).
These findings indicate that some SPDs may not comply with ERISA § 102(a)’s
requirement that SPDs “shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant” (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)). Furthermore, the federal law’s purpose
of providing participants and beneficiaries with full disclosure of relevant information
concerning their health plans may be frustrated by the high level of reading ability needed
to understand SPDs. Although ERISA does not detail the standards by which
understanding should be measured, it does require that SPDs be understandable to the
average employee. To date, the reading ability of the average employee has not been
determined. However, the National Adult Literacy Survey found that 20 to 23% of adults
are functionally illiterate and another 26% have marginal literary skills (Kirsh et al.,
1993). Furthermore, 16% of adults age 25 or older have not graduated from high school
according to 2005 U.S. Census data.
The finding from the present study that some SPDs require college-age reading
ability, if replicated, could have serious implications. Because this finding is based on a
small sample of SPDs, these results should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless,
SPDs are the primary source of information for participants in employer-sponsored
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healthcare plans. In this age of consumer-driven healthcare, it is critical that individuals
be able to understand the benefits covered by their plans and the rights and
responsibilities they have under their plans. Along these lines, many institutional review
boards require that medical consent forms be written at 5th- to 10th-grade reading levels
(Paasche-Orlow et al., 2003). The present study indicates that some SPDs are written
well above this standard and likely fail to meet ERISA’s requirement that SPDs be
understandable to the average plan participant.
Study 2
In Study 2, employees read either original or redrafted versions of medical
necessity and claims procedure clauses. Participants were tested on their comprehension
of the clauses, and they completed a health literacy test. Participants also reported their
personal health history and insurance status. I hypothesized that employees with higher
health literacy and more experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate
greater comprehension than employees with lower health literacy and less familiarity
with the healthcare industry. More importantly, I expected to find that participants who
received the redrafted clauses would demonstrate better comprehension than participants
who received the original clauses would.
Method
Participants. Employed adults (N = 400), who had volunteered to participate in
web-based research through www.studyresponse.com, were recruited through an email
which contained a link to the study website. Participants who completed the study were
entered into a lottery to receive gift certificates for their participation. Of the 400
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employed adults recruited to participate in the study, 88 individuals (22%) completed the
study.
Materials. I chose the clauses for Study 2 and 3 based on the readability scores
found in Study 1. Reliability analyses on z-scores from each readability measure (i.e.,
Flesch Reading Ease formula, Flesch Grade Level formula, and Fog Index) produced
alpha coefficients of .94 for the medical necessity clauses and .98 for the claims
procedure clauses. These results demonstrate that these three indicators of readability
were measuring the same construct. A single standard score was created by computing
the average of the transformed readability scores.
For each clause, the standard scores were divided into quartiles. To increase
generalizability, two medical necessity and two claims procedure clauses that were
representative (e.g., average word count, contained all sections of the clauses) of each
type of clause were chosen from the 10 medical necessity and 10 claims procedure
clauses with the poorest readability scores.
To create the redrafted clauses, complex sentences were broken up into simpler
sentences, long words were made into shorter words, the tone was changed from third to
second person, and the technical nature of the documents was reduced by eliminating
jargon (Wogalter et al., 1999). Although readability scores are also dependent on word
count, it is difficult to reduce word count without changing meaning, so I attempted to
keep the word count similar for the original and redrafted versions. The redrafted clauses
also were improved in ways, such as enlarging the font, reordering the text, and indenting
subcategories, that would not change the readability scores. The original and redrafted
clauses are presented side by side in Appendix B; although the redrafted clauses were
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displayed in a larger font than the original clauses on the website, the redrafted and
original clauses are presented in the same font size in Appendix B for ease of
comparison. A professor of ERISA law compared the original and redrafted documents
to ensure the substantive content had remained the same. The readability scores for the
original and redrafted clauses are presented in Table 3 for the medical necessity clauses
and in Table 4 for the claims procedure clauses.

Table 3. Objective Readability of Selected Medical Necessity Clauses
Plan 1

Plan 2

Original

Redrafted

Original

Redrafted

Flesch Reading Ease

28

37

21

37

Flesch Grade Level

14.3

12.6

14.4

11.5

FOG Index

17.2

15.5

17.0

14.0

Words

859

900

774

776

1 syllable

446

490

395

427

≥3 syllables

226

208

241

201

Difficult Words

202

186

202

165

Syllables

1618

1617

1543

1432

Sentences

44

50

47

57

31

Table 4. Objective Readability of Selected Claims Procedure Clauses
Plan 1

Plan 2

Original

Redrafted

Original

Redrafted

Flesch Reading Ease

31

50

34

47

Flesch Grade Level

16.4

11.5

15.5

12.0

FOG Index

18.9

14.2

18.3

14.7

Words

2635

2656

1772

1834

1 syllable

1566

1721

1075

1171

≥3 syllables

525

449

350

313

Difficult Words

458

386

313

280

Syllables

4526

4247

3024

2983

Sentences

88

126

63

85

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the versions of the
clauses (original v. redrafted). They read one medical necessity and one claims
procedure clause. Participants completed the study over the internet. After providing
informed consent, participants were instructed to read the sections of a Health Plan as if
they were members of the Health Plan. They were informed they would be questioned
about the Health Plan and the Health Plan would be available for them to refer back to.
After reading the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses, participants
answered demographic questions.
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As a manipulation check, participants rated their agreement with the following
statements on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree): (1)
the Health Plan sections on coverage (medical necessity) were easy to understand; (2) I
understood the Health Plan sections on coverage (medical necessity); (3) the Health Plan
sections on claims were easy to understand; and (4) I understood the Health Plan sections
on claims.
Then, participants completed a comprehension test on the Health Plan (see
Appendix C), during which they were able to refer back to the clauses. The questionnaire
assessed declarative knowledge (e.g., when is care considered medically necessary?) and
procedural knowledge (e.g., do participants have to exhaust the plan’s administrative
appeal process?) through multiple-choice questions. Although the questions set out in
Appendix C are grouped by clause and question type, the order of questions presented to
participants was mixed.
Based on Wiener et al.’s (1998, 2004) methods, responses to the comprehension
test were coded as follows: correct responses (hits) = 1; incorrect responses (misses) = -1;
and I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question (do not know)
responses = 0. This method of calculation rewarded hits, neutralized do not know
responses, and penalized misses. Accuracy averages could range from 1.00 (all hits) to 1.00 (all misses). I calculated an overall comprehension accuracy score and subscale
comprehension accuracy scores. Each subscale score was calculated by summing up the
scores of the items on that subscale and dividing by the total number of items on that
subscale.
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Following the comprehension test, participants completed the reading
comprehension section of the short version of the Test of Functional Health Literacy in
Adults (S-TOFHLA; Baker, Williams, Parker, Gazmararian, & Nurss, 1999; see
Appendix D). The comprehension section of the S-TOFHLA has internal consistency (α
= .97) and is strongly correlated (r = .81) with the Rapid Estimate of Adult Literacy in
Medicine (REALM), similar to the full version of the TOFHLA (r = .84; Baker et al.,
1999). For this test, participants read prose passages written at grade levels of 4.3 and
10.4, as measured by the Gunning-Fox index. The passages are instructions for
preparation for an upper gastrointestinal tract radiograph procedure and the patient
“Rights and Responsibilities” section of the Medicaid application, respectively.
Comprehension is measured by a 36-item test using the modified Cloze procedure; that
is, every fifth to seventh word in the passages is missing, and participants must choose
from four multiple choice options. Correct responses receive one point, and incorrect
responses receive no points. Scores from 0 to 16 indicate inadequate health literacy, such
that individuals will often misread the simplest materials, including prescription bottles
and appointment slips. Scores from 17 to 22 indicate marginal health literacy, such that
individuals will perform better on the simplest tasks but will have difficulty with more
complex material, including insurance information about their rights and responsibilities.
Scores from 23 to 36 indicate adequate health literacy, such that individuals will
successfully complete most tasks necessary to function in the healthcare setting but may
have difficulty with materials written above the 10th-grade reading level.
Then participants provided information about their health history. Participants
were asked to rate their health status as poor, fair, good, or excellent. Participants were
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asked whether they have at least one chronic disease, whether they were hospitalized for
inpatient or outpatient treatment in the last year, and if hospitalized, how many days they
were hospitalized. Participants also were asked whether they have seen a doctor in the
last two years; if so, how many doctors they have seen in the last two years; and whether
they have seen a specialist in the last two years.
In addition, participants were asked questions concerning their health insurance
status. Participants indicated whether they have health insurance, whether they have
privately-funded health insurance (e.g., HMOs, PPOs, fee-for-service), whether they have
publicly-funded health insurance (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare), whether they have health
insurance through their employer or a family member’s employer, and whether they have
supplemental health insurance. If they had health insurance, participants reported the
number of years they have had health insurance. Participants also were asked whether
they have sought pre-authorization for coverage, submitted a pre-service claim, submitted
a post-service claim, appealed a denial of coverage to their health plan, or appealed a
denial of coverage through a lawsuit.
Results and Discussion
Participants (N = 6) who spent less than five minutes answering study questions
were excluded from data analyses, leaving 81 participants. There were 36 participants in
the original clause condition, and 45 participants in the redrafted clause condition.
Participants dropped from data analyses were not more likely to be in the original clause
condition than in the redrafted clause condition, χ2(1, N = 87) = .07, p = .79. Participants
included in analyses spent an average of 1040.14 seconds (~17 minutes; SD = 1768.61)
answering questions. The demographic characteristics of the 81 participants included in
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subsequent analyses are presented in Table 5. There was only one difference in
comprehension across demographic groups. Older participants had better
comprehension, r(81) = .37, p < .01, which is inconsistent with the finding that greater
knowledge of health insurance has been associated with younger age (Cafferata, 1984;
Lambert, 1980; McCall et al., 1986). Because 96.3% of participants demonstrated
adequate health literacy (M = 34.10, SD = 3.66, Range = 13-36) as measured by the STOFHLA, I was not able to use health literacy in subsequent analyses.

Table 5. Participant Demographic Information
Gender

35.9% men

Race

82.7% Caucasian

Age

M = 40.31 years

Education

51.9% some college or more

Household Income

43.8% less than $50,000

Work for pay

97.5%

Work > 30 hrs a week

86.4%

States represented

29

Plan Differences. To determine whether the clauses from Health Plan 1 and 2
could be combined for analyses, I compared the scores on the appropriate comprehension
subscales for each Plan. For the medical necessity clauses, scores of participants who
received the original version of Plan 1 (M = .14, SD = .42; M = -.10, SD = .38) did not
differ on the declarative and procedural question subscales from scores of participants
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who received the original version of Plan 2 (M = .28, SD = .33; M = -.14, SD = .36), ts(1,
34) = 1.10, .33, ps = .28, .74. Scores of participants who received the redrafted version of
Plan 1 (M = .23, SD = .36; M = .06, SD = .31) did not differ on the declarative and
procedural question subscales from scores of participants who received the redrafted
version of Plan 2 (M = .31, SD = .32; M = .06, SD = .39), ts(1, 43) = .75, .09, ps = .46,
.93. Because scores on the declarative and procedural questions did not differ depending
on whether participants read the medical necessity clause from Plan 1 or Plan 2, the Plans
were collapsed for analyses.
For the claims procedure clauses, scores of participants who received the original
version of Plan 1 (M = .05, SD = .16; M = .39, SD = .25) did not differ on the declarative
and procedural question subscales from scores of participants who received the original
version of Plan 2 (M = .02, SD = .33; M = .35, SD = .26), ts(1, 34) = .31, .52, ps = .76,
.61. Scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 1 (M = .05, SD =
.31; M = .31, SD = .31) did not differ on the declarative and procedural question
subscales from scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 2 (M =
.12, SD = .44; M = .21, SD = .28), ts(1, 43) = .61, 1.18, ps = .54, .25. Because scores on
the declarative and procedural questions did not differ depending on whether participants
read the claims procedure clause from Plan 1 or Plan 2, the Plans were collapsed for
analyses.
Manipulation Checks. To test whether participants detected a difference in the
readability of the original and redrafted clauses, t-tests were used to examine perceptions
of understandability. Participants were asked to rate how easy it was to understand the
clauses and how well they understood the clauses. For the medical necessity clauses,
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participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.12) did not rate the clause
they read as any easier to understand than did participants in the original clause condition
(M = 3.36, SD = 1.05) did, t(1, 79) = .16, p = .87, d = .04. Similarly, participants in the
redrafted clause condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.07) did not claim that they understood the
clause they read any better than did participants in the original clause condition (M =
3.64, SD = .87) did, t(1, 79) = .18, p = .86, d = .04.
For the claims procedure clauses, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M
= 3.16, SD = 1.15) did not rate the clause they read as any easier to understand than did
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.06) did, t(1, 78) = .86, p =
.39, d = .19. Similarly, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.38, SD =
1.09) did not claim that they understood the clause they read any better than did
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.58, SD = .94) did, t(1, 79) = .90, p =
.37, d = .20.
Because the manipulation check failed when participants saw only one version of
the clauses, I ran a post-hoc study to establish that the redrafted clauses were more
readable than the original clauses when participants read both versions. Undergraduates
(N = 25) and employees (N = 21) were instructed to compare the readability of the
original and redrafted clauses. Participants were given one of the versions (original or
redrafted) of either Plan 1 or Plan 2’s medical necessity clause followed by the other
version; the order of presentation was counterbalanced. Then participants were asked to
rate which clause was easier to read on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (Clause A was
much easier to read) to 7 (Clause B was much easier to read), and which clause was
more understandable on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (Clause A was much more
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understandable) to 7 (Clause B was much more understandable). Participants also were
asked to rate which clause they found preferable on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1
(Strongly prefer Clause A) to 7 (Strongly prefer Clause B). On all the scales, 4 was
labeled Neutral. Then, participants repeated the same procedure with one of the versions
(original or redrafted) of either Plan 1 or Plan 2’s claims procedure clause.
Because the reliability coefficients for the three questions was high regarding the
medical necessity clauses (α = .94) and the claims procedure clauses (α = .90), the
measures were combined into one readability index. The ratings for each of the questions
and the combined readability index are presented in Table 6 and 7. As reported here,
higher scores indicate that the redrafted clauses were easier to read, easier to understand,
and more preferable.

Table 6. Average Subjective Readability of Medical Necessity Clauses
Plan 1 (N = 23)

Plan 2 (N = 23)

Total (N = 46)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Readable

6.00 (1.48)

5.22 (1.70)

5.61 (1.63)

Understandable

5.83 (1.83)

4.87 (1.52)

5.35 (1.73)

Preferable

6.04 (1.58)

5.48 (1.70)

5.76 (1.65)

Readability Index 5.96 (1.54)

5.19 (1.56)

5.57 (1.58)
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Table 7. Average Subjective Readability of Claims Procedure Clauses
Plan 1 (N = 22)

Plan 2 (N = 23)

Total (N = 45)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Readable

5.73 (1.61)

5.57 (1.70)

5.64 (1.64)

Understandable

5.41 (1.22)

5.65 (1.47)

5.53 (1.34)

Preferable

5.77 (1.41)

5.78 (1.35)

5.78 (1.36)

Readability Index 5.64 (1.32)

5.67 (1.37)

5.65 (1.33)

The means indicate that participants rated the redrafted clauses on average as
slightly to somewhat more readable, understandable, and preferable than the original
clauses. There were no significant differences between Plan 1 and Plan 2 for the medical
necessity clauses or the claims procedure clauses. An independent t-test was run
comparing the readability index score to the neutral point (i.e., 4) on the scale of the pilot
questions. The t-test revealed that participants rated the redrafted clauses as more
readable than the original clauses for both the medical necessity clauses, t(1, 45) = 6.74, p
< .001, d = 2.00, and the claims procedure clauses, t(1, 44) = 8.35, p < .001, d = 2.49.
These findings indicate that, despite the manipulation check failure, the redrafting did
affect the clauses’ readability and comprehensibility.
Redrafting. In Study 2, participants completed a comprehension test to
demonstrate their understanding of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.
The mean overall comprehension accuracy score across all test items was .15 (SD = .20),
which indicates that participants made slightly more correct responses than incorrect
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responses. Although .15 is not very far above the chance level of zero, an independent ttest showed that this difference was significant, t(1, 80) = 6.78, p < .001, d = 1.52. On
average, 52.98% of participants’ responses were hits, 37.68% were misses, and 9.34%
were do not know answers. Thus, participants demonstrated poor comprehension of their
benefits and their rights and responsibilities regarding the Health Plan. This result is
similar to the poor comprehension (.21) found in Wiener et al.’s (1998) Juror
Comprehension Survey, where 56% of participants’ responses were hits, 33.5% were
misses, and 10.5% were do not know answers.
I hypothesized that participants who received the redrafted clauses would
demonstrate better comprehension than participants who received the original clauses. A
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with clause subject (i.e., medical necessity
and claims procedure) and knowledge type (i.e., declarative and procedural) as withinsubjects factors and clause (original v. redrafted) as the between-subjects factor. The
ANOVA revealed no main effect for clause, F(1, 79) = .93, p = .34, ηp2 = .01.
Inconsistent with predictions, redrafting did not improve comprehension. This finding is
discussed further with results from Study 3.
There was a significant main effect for clause subject, F(1, 79) = 6.48, p < .05, ηp2
= .08, such that participants had better knowledge for the claims procedure clauses (M
=.18, SD = .24) than for the medical necessity clauses (M = .11, SD = .26). This finding
suggests that the claims procedure questions may have been easier than the medical
necessity questions. There was a significant 2-way interaction between clause subject
and knowledge type, F(1, 79) = 64.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .45; the means for the different
subscales are presented in Table 8.
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Table 8. Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales
M

SD

Range

Declarative

.25

.35

-.71-.71

Procedural

-.02

.36

-.71-.86

Declarative

.06

.33

-.78-1.00

Procedural

.31

.28

-.56-.89

Medical Necessity

Claims Procedure

Participants were more accurate when medical necessity questions were directed at
declarative knowledge rather than procedural knowledge, t(1, 80) = 4.99, p < .001, d =
1.12, and when claims procedure questions were directed at procedural knowledge rather
than declarative knowledge t(1, 80) = 5.66, p < .001, d = 1.27. This finding makes sense
given the nature of the clauses; medical necessity clauses contain content-based
information, and claims procedure clauses contain applications of concepts. Wiener et al.
(1998) also found differences in participants’ comprehension of jury instructions
depending on question type, such that participants performed better on declarative
knowledge questions than on procedural knowledge questions.
In addition, there was a significant 2-way interaction between clause subject and
clause, F(1, 79) = 4.60, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. Redrafting improved comprehension for the
medical necessity clauses, t(1, 79) = 2.01, p < .05, d = .45, but not for the claims
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procedure clauses, t(1, 79) = .40, p = .69, d =.09. The average scores for the clause
subjects and the subscales as a function of clause are shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales as a Function of Clause
Original (N = 36)

Redrafted (N = 45)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Medical Necessity

.05 (.27)

.16 (.24)

Declarative

.23 (.37)

.26 (.34)

Procedural

-.13 (.36)

.06 (.34)

Claims Procedure

.20 (.21)

.17 (.26)

Declarative

.03 (.28)

.08 (.37)

Procedural

.36 (.25)

.26 (.30)

There also was a significant 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type,
and clause, F(1, 79) = 5.20, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. I hypothesized that participants in the
redrafted clause condition would perform better on all of the comprehension subscales
than participants in the original clause condition would. Follow-up t-tests revealed that
participants’ comprehension on the medical necessity declarative questions subscale, t(1,
79) = .42, p = .67, d =.09, the claims procedure declarative questions subscale, t(1, 79) =
.72, p = .48, d =.16, and the claims procedure procedural questions subscale, t(1, 79) =
1.59, p = .12, d =.36, did not differ significantly by clause condition. However, the
means were in the expected directions, except on the claims procedure procedural
questions subscale. Consistent with hypotheses, there was a significant difference

43
between participants in the redrafted clause condition and participants in the original
clause condition on medical necessity procedural questions, t(1, 79) = 2.39, p < .05, d
=.54, with participants in the redrafted clause condition performing better on that
subscale. Because I did not predict that comprehension would vary depending on
question type and the subscale differences found in Study 2 may not generalize, these
differences are discussed in relation to results from Study 3.
Health History and Insurance Status. I also expected that employees with more
experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate greater comprehension than
employees with less familiarity with the healthcare industry. Participants’ health history
is presented in Table 10. Several t-tests were run to determine if several measures of
health history were related to overall comprehension. Participants reporting poor or fair
health were compared to participants reporting good or excellent health, participants with
a chronic disease were compared to participants without a chronic disease, participants
hospitalized in the last two years were compared to participants who were not
hospitalized in the last two years, participants who had seen a doctor in the last two years
were compared to participants who had not seen a doctor in the last two years, and
participants who had seen a specialist were compared to participants who had not seen a
specialist. The only effect that was significant was inconsistent with hypotheses.
Participants who had seen a specialist in the last two years had lower overall
comprehension (M = .10, SD = .18) than participants who had not seen a specialist (M =
.19, SD = .21), t(1, 75) = 2.14, p < .05, d =.49. Therefore, the present study did not find
any evidence for the hypothesis that more experience with the healthcare industry leads
to better comprehension of healthcare documents.
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Table 10. Participant Health History
Status
Poor

1.2%

Fair

21.0%

Good

53.1%

Excellent

24.7%

Chronic disease

23.5%

Hospital (in last year)

24.7%

Days hospitalized

4.94

Doctor (in last 2 years)

84.0%

Doctors seen

2.81

Specialist

54.5%

Participants’ insurance status is presented in Table 11. T-tests were run to
determine if two measures of insurance status had an influence on comprehension.
Participants with insurance (M = .16, SD = .20) were compared to participants without
insurance (M = .13, SD = .20), and participants with some claims experience (M = .15,
SD = .21) were compared to participants without any claims experience (M = .15, SD =
.18). There were no significant effects of insurance status or claims experience on overall
comprehension, ts (1, 79) = .58, .14, ps = .57, .89, ds =.13, .03. Therefore, the present
study did not find any evidence that more experience with the health insurance industry
leads to better comprehension of health insurance documents.
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Table 11. Participant Insurance Status
No insurance

22.2%

Private insurer

33.3%

Public insurer

13.6%

Employer insurer

44.4%

Supplemental insurance

1.2%

Years insured

11.58

Claims experience

61.7%

Pre-authorization

43.2%

Pre-service claim

17.3%

Post-service claim

23.5%

Denied coverage

2.5%

Appealed denial

1.2%

Repeated measure ANOVAs were run to determine if insurance status and claims
experience moderated the 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type, and
clause. Although the 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type, and
clause was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = .32, p = .58, ηp2 = .02, the
interaction was significant for the insured, F(1, 61) = 6.60, p < .05, ηp2 = .10. The main
effect for clause was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = 2.29, p = .15, ηp2 = .13,
but it was marginally significant for the insured, F(1, 61) = 3.44, p = .07, ηp2 = .05. The
main effect for clause subject was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = .00, p =
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.96, ηp = .00, but it was significant for the insured, F(1, 61) = 7.46, p < .01, ηp = .11.
2

2

The 2-way interaction between clause subject and knowledge type was not significant for
the uninsured, F(1, 16) = 3.27, p = .09, ηp2 = .17, but it was significant for the insured,
F(1, 61) = 77.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. In contrast, the 2-way interaction between clause
subject and clause was significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = 5.51, p < .05, , ηp2 = .26,
but not for the insured, F(1, 61) = 1.89, p = .17, ηp2 = .03.
Although the 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type, and
clause was not significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 29) = .07, p =
.79, ηp2 = .00, the interaction was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 48) =
8.74, p < .01, ηp2 = .15. The main effect for clause was not significant for those without
claims experience, F(1, 29) =.90, p = .35, ηp2 = .03, but it was marginally significant for
those with claims experience, F(1, 48) = 3.32, p = .08, ηp2 = .07. The main effect for
clause subject was not significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 29) = .54, p =
.47, ηp2 = .02, but it was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 48) = 6.71, p <
.05, ηp2 = .12. The presence of a 2-way interaction between clause subject and
knowledge type and the lack of a 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause
was consistent across claims experience. These results suggest that the positive effect
redrafting had on comprehension of certain subscales only existed for participants with
health insurance and/or claims experience. Perhaps, individuals need some experience
with the health insurance industry to benefit from simplified healthcare documents.
Study 3
In Study 3, employees and undergraduates read the same clauses presented in
Study 2. Participants either read plan documents without any a priori knowledge

47
(reading-to-learn condition) or knowing they had been denied coverage (reading-to-do
condition). In addition to completing the comprehension test used in Study 2,
participants were told the Health Plan had denied them care that they had requested and
they took part in a simulated appeals process. Participants assessed the procedural
fairness of the appeal process and their satisfaction with the plan. I expected
comprehension to be better for the redrafted clauses, as compared to the original clauses,
and for the reading-to-do task, as compared to the reading-to-learn task. I also expected
comprehension, plan approval, and the strength of the claim to predict the decision to
appeal. I hypothesized that better comprehension would be associated with an increased
propensity to appeal a strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a weak claim. I
also expected participants to appeal the plan administrator’s decision more often when
they perceived the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and when they were
less satisfied with the plan.
Method
Participants. Employed adults (N = 800), who had volunteered to participate in
web-based research through www.studyresponse.com, were recruited through an email
which contained a link to the study website. Employees were entered into a lottery to
receive gift certificates for their participation. Of the 800 employees recruited to
participate in the study, 126 individuals (16%) completed the study.
Because an insufficient number of employee participants completed the study,
undergraduate students were recruited from University of Nebraska-Lincoln psychology
courses. Students (N = 126) received extra credit for their participation.
Materials. Participants read the same clauses used in Study 2.
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In addition, participants were provided benefit denial letters (see Appendix E)
from the hypothetical Health Plan’s claims administrator. The letter was adapted from an
actual benefit denial letter collected along with the litigated SPDs.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to the 2 (clause: original v.
redrafted) x 2 (task: reading-to-learn v. reading-to-do) x 2 (claim: weak v. strong)
between-subjects factorial. Participants completed the study over the internet and
provided informed consent.
In the reading-to-learn task condition, participants were instructed to read the
sections of a Health Plan as if they were members of the Health Plan. They were
informed that they would be questioned about the Health Plan and the Health Plan would
be available for them to refer back. In the reading-to-do task condition, participants
received additional instructions: “As you read about the Health Plan, keep in mind that
the claims administrator for the Health Plan has denied you coverage for care your
physician believed was medically necessary.”
After reading the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses, participants
answered demographic questions.
Participants completed the same manipulation checks as Study 2. In addition,
participants were asked whether they were instructed that the claims administrator for the
Health Plan had denied them coverage for care their physician believed was medically
necessary before they read the Health Plan.
Then, participants completed the same comprehension test from Study 2.
After completing the comprehension test, participants were instructed to imagine
that they were members of the Health Plan about which they just had read and that they
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had been seeing their doctors about varicose veins in their legs. In the weak claim
condition, participants were told that they, in agreement with their doctor, thought the
varicose veins should be removed because they were visibly unattractive and
occasionally painful. In the strong claim condition, participants were told that they, in
agreement with their doctor, thought the varicose veins should be removed because they
had made walking and exercise painful. Participants were informed that they had filed a
pre-service claim for surgical removal of varicose veins and then read the Health Plan’s
response to their request (see Appendix E).
As a manipulation check, participants rated their agreement with the following
statements on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree): (1)
in this situation, I would have had a strong claim for surgical removal of varicose veins
and (2) in this situation, the Health Plan was right to deny my claim for surgical removal
of varicose veins.
Participants were asked how they would respond to the denial. They answered
the following questions on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5
(extremely likely): (1) in this situation, how likely would you be to appeal the claim
administrator’s decision through the Health Plan’s appeal process and (2) in this
situation, how likely would you be to seek legal counsel before you appeal the decision
through the Health Plan’s appeal process.
Then, participants rated their agreement with procedural fairness statements about
the Health Plan on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree) (see Appendix F). The questions were drawn from studies that examined
procedural fairness in the healthcare context (e.g., Hibbard & Jewett, 1997; Murphy-
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Berman et al., 1999; Roberts & Markel, 2001; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). The questions
addressed several characteristics of procedural fairness: control, neutrality, trust, and
social standing (Tyler, 1989). Participants also were asked questions regarding their
satisfaction with the Health Plan (see Appendix F) based on previous studies (i.e.,
Edgman-Levitan & Cleary, 1996; Harris-Kojetin et al., 2001; Hibbard & Jewett, 1997).
The procedural fairness and plan satisfaction items were combined to create an index of
plan approval.
Then, participants received a second benefit denial letter (see Appendix E) that
confirmed the Health Plan’s first denial of coverage. Participants answered the following
questions on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely likely): (1) in
this situation, how likely would you be to sue the Health Plan under Section 502(a) of
ERISA and (2) in this situation, how likely would you be to seek legal counsel in order to
decide whether you should appeal the Health Plan’s decision through the legal system.
At this point, participants answered the questions regarding procedural fairness and plan
satisfaction again.
Finally, participants completed the S-TOFHLA and questions about their health
history and insurance status from Study 2.
Results and Discussion
Participants (N = 21) who spent less than ten minutes answering study questions
were excluded from data analyses, leaving 210 participants. Ns across conditions ranged
from 98 to 112. Participants dropped from data analyses were not more likely to be in the
original clause condition than in the redrafted clause condition, χ2(1, N = 231) = 1.00, p =
.32. Participants included in analyses spent an average of 2101.73 seconds (~35 minutes;
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SD = 5817.19) answering questions. The demographic characteristics of the 210
participants included in subsequent analyses are presented in Table 12. There were few
differences in comprehension across demographic groups. Women (M = .21, SD = .18)
had better comprehension than men (M = .13, SD = .18), t(1, 206) = 2.71, p < .01, d =
.38, which is inconsistent with the finding that greater knowledge of health insurance has
been associated with being male (Lambert, 1980; McCormack et al., 2002). Consistent
with results from Study 2, older participants had better comprehension, r(201) = .19, p <
.01. Inconsisent with other studies, higher education, higher income, and being White
were not associated with greater knowledge of health insurance information.
Because 100% of participants demonstrated adequate health literacy (M = 34.93,
SD = 1.33, Range = 28-36) as measured by the S-TOFHLA, I was not able to use health
literacy in subsequent analyses.
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Table 12. Participant Demographic Information
Employees (N = 93)

Students (N = 117)

Gender

28.3% men

26.5% men

Race

80.6% Caucasian

82.9% Caucasian

Age

M = 40.52 years

M = 21.72 years

Education

48.4% some college or more 100% some college

Household Income

50.5% less than $50,000

30.8% less than $50,000

Work for pay

93.5%

72.6%

Work > 30 hrs a week

76.3%

19%

States represented

33

Nebraska

Participant Type Differences. I compared the scores on the comprehension scale
and subscales for each participant type to determine whether the two groups could be
combined for analyses. Table 13 shows employees’ and students’ scores on the
comprehension subscales.
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Table 13. Employee and Student Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales
Employees (N = 93)

Students (N = 117)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Declarative

.35 (.34)

.22 (.32)

Procedural

.03 (.35)

.02 (.31)

Declarative

.17 (.29)

.09 (.29)

Procedural

.31 (.27)

.31 (.26)

.22 (.19)

.16 (.17)

Medical Necessity

Claims Procedure

Overall

Employees scored significantly higher than students on the medical necessity declarative
question subscale, claims procedure declarative question subscale, and overall
comprehension scale, ts(1, 208) = 2.88, 2.03, 2.20, ps <.05, ds = .40, .28, .31. Employees
and students did not differ from each other on the medical necessity procedural question
subscale and the claims procedure procedural question subscale, ts(1, 208) = .10, .23, ps
= .92, .82, ds = .01, .03. Because employees and students did differ from each other on
some of the comprehension measures, participant type was included as a separate factor
in subsequent analyses.
Plan Differences. Again, I compared the scores on the appropriate
comprehension subscales for each Health Plan to determine whether the clauses from
Plan 1 and 2 could be combined for analyses. For the medical necessity clauses, scores
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of participants who received the original version of Plan 1 (M = .29, SD = .35; M = .03,
SD = .33) did not differ on the declarative and procedural question subscales from scores
of participants who received the original version of Plan 2 (M = .30, SD = .33; M = .10,
SD = .36), ts(1, 102) = .17, 1.02, ps = .87, .31. However, scores of participants who
received the redrafted version of Plan 1 (M = .20, SD = .31; M = .06, SD = .29) did differ
on the declarative and procedural question subscales from scores of participants who
received the redrafted version of Plan 2 (M = .34, SD = .34; M = -.09, SD = .30), ts(1,
104) = 2.14, 2.59, ps < .05, ds = .42, .51. Participants who read the redrafted version of
Plan 1, as compared to Plan 2, performed worse on the declarative question subscale but
performed better on the procedural question subscale. Because the results of the Plans
were mixed in Study 3 and there were no differences between the Plans in Study 2, the
Plans were collapsed for analyses.
For the claims procedure clauses, scores of participants who received the original
version of Plan 1 (M = .13, SD = .27; M = .31, SD = .26) did not differ on the declarative
and procedural question subscales from scores of participants who received the original
version of Plan 2 (M = .05, SD = .30; M = .27, SD = .23), ts(1, 102) = 1.50, .92, p = .14,
.36. Scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 1 (M = .19, SD =
.29; M = .35, SD = .29) did not differ on the declarative and procedural question
subscales from scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 2 (M =
.14, SD = .31; M = .31, SD = .28), ts(1, 104) = .94, .61, p = .35, .54. Because scores on
the declarative and procedural questions did not differ depending on whether participants
read the claims procedure clause from Plan 1 or Plan 2, the Plans were collapsed for
analyses.
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Manipulation Checks. Again, t-tests were used to examine perceptions of
understandability to test whether participants detected a difference in the readability of
the original and redrafted clauses. Participants were asked to rate how easy it was to
understand the clauses and how well they understood the clauses. For the medical
necessity clauses, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.39, SD = .97) rated
the clause they read as significantly easier to understand than participants in the original
clause condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.05) did, t(1, 208) = 2.09, p < .05, d = .29. However,
participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.56, SD = .92) did not claim that they
personally understood the clause they read any better than participants in the original
clause condition (M = 3.51, SD = .99) did, t(1, 206) = .36, p = .72, d = .05.
For the claims procedure clauses, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M
= 3.29, SD = 1.02) rated the clause they read as marginally easier to understand than
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.04, SD = 1.06) did, t(1, 207) = 1.72, p
= .09, d = .24. However, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.42, SD =
.93) did not claim that they personally understood the clause they read any better than
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.05) did, t(1, 206) = .88, p =
.38, d = .12. Therefore, participants rated the redrafted versions of the clauses as easier to
understand, but they did not feel that they personally understood the redrafted versions
any more than they understood the original versions. These results suggest that although
the redrafted clauses appeared more readable than the original clauses, participants did
not feel like they understood them any better. However, these results were based on
participants reading only one type of clause. When participants read both the original
and redrafted versions of the clauses in the post-hoc study reported in Study 2,
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participants rated the redrafted clauses as more readable than the original clauses. Thus,
despite the mixed results of the manipulation check, the redrafting did appear to affect
perceptions of the clauses’ readability and comprehensibility.
As a manipulation check for the task condition, participants were asked whether
they were instructed before they read the Health Plan that the claims administrator for the
Health Plan had denied them coverage for care their physician believed was medically
necessary. Seventy percent of participants in the reading-to-do task condition correctly
reported that before they read plan documents they were instructed that the claims
administrator had denied them coverage for care. Correspondingly, 81% of participants
in the reading-to-learn task condition correctly reported that before they read plan
documents they were not instructed that the claims administrator had denied them
coverage for care. Because so many participants (N = 50) would be dropped based on the
task manipulation check, analyses were performed both with (N = 210) and without (N =
160) participants who failed the manipulation check. These analyses yielded highly
comparable findings, so the following sections present results for the entire sample.
As a manipulation check for claim condition, participants were asked to rate the
strength of their claim for surgical removal of varicose veins and the rightness of the
plan’s denial of their claim after the first and second benefit denial letter. Because the
reliability coefficients for the four questions was high (α = .86), the measures were
combined into one claim strength index. Participants in the strong claim condition (M =
3.46, SD = .86) rated their claim as significantly stronger than participants in the weak
claim condition (M = 2.34, SD = .83), t(1, 207) = 9.57, p < .001, d = 1.33. Therefore, the
claim strength manipulation was successful.
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Participant Type. I did not have any a priori hypotheses regarding employees’
and students’ comprehension of the clauses. Because employees scored better than
students on some of the subscales, I included participant type in my analyses. A repeated
measures ANOVA was performed with clause subject (i.e., medical necessity and claims
procedure) and knowledge type (i.e., declarative and procedural) as within-subjects
factors and clause (original v. redrafted), task (reading-to-learn v. reading-to-do), and
participant type (employees v. students) as between-subjects factors. The ANOVA
revealed a main effect for participant type, F(1, 202) = 4.64, p < .05, ηp2 = .02.
Employees’ and students’ scores on the comprehension tests are shown in Table
13 above. There also was a significant 2-way interaction between knowledge type and
participant type, F(1, 202) = 7.40, p < .01, ηp2 = .04, such that employees demonstrated
greater declarative knowledge than students, t(1, 208) = 3.06, p < .01, d = .42, but the two
groups did not differ in procedural knowledge, t(1, 208) = .22, p = .83, d = .03. As
discussed above, employees’ and students’ comprehension did not differ on the medical
necessity procedural question subscale and the claims procedure procedural question
subscale, but employees scored significantly higher than students on the medical
necessity declarative question subscale, claims procedure declarative question subscale,
and overall comprehension scale. Therefore, employees retained more declarative
knowledge regarding the clauses than students did. One explanation for why employees
performed better than students on some measures could have been that employees spent
more time on the task. However, employees (M = 825.24 seconds, SD = 1208.03) did not
spend more time on the comprehension test than students did (M = 846.23 seconds, SD =
590.12), t(1, 208) = .17, p = .87; indeed, employees spent slightly less time on the task
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than students. A more likely reason that employees may have performed better than
students is that employees had slightly more experience with the healthcare system and
the insurance industry than students. This finding is discussed below in the section on
health history and insurance status (see Tables 18 and 19).
Redrafting. Participants completed a comprehension test to demonstrate their
understanding of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses. Across employee
and student participants, the mean overall comprehension accuracy score across all test
items was .19 (SD = .18), which indicates that participants made slightly more correct
responses than incorrect responses. This result is slightly higher than the mean overall
comprehension accuracy score found in Study 2 (M = .15). Although .19 is not very far
above the chance level of zero, an independent t-test showed that this difference was
significant, t(1, 209) = 14.99, p < .001, d = 2.07. On average, 52.57% of participants’
responses were hits, 33.66% were misses, and 13.77% were do not know answers.
Therefore, participants demonstrated poor comprehension of their benefits and their
rights and responsibilities regarding the Health Plan. These percentages are similar to
those found in Study 2. Table 14 shows the comprehension rates broken out by
participant type.
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Table 14. Comprehension Rates as a Function of Participant Type
Employees (N = 93)

Students (N = 117)

Overall

.22

.16

Hits

.54

.51

Misses

.33

.35

Do Not Know

.13

.14

T-test from zero

t(1, 92) = 10.88,

t(1, 116) = 10.50,

p < .001, d = 2.27

p < .001, d = 1.95

Again, I hypothesized that comprehension would be better for the redrafted clause
as compared to the original clause. The repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main
effect for clause, F(1, 202) = .01, p = .91, ηp2 = .00. Both Study 2 and 3 found that
redrafting did not improve comprehension of medical necessity and claims procedure
clauses. Although the post-hoc study reported in Study 2 and the manipulation check on
redrafting in Study 3 indicated that there was a difference between the readability of the
clauses, the comprehension test demonstrated that redrafting was not effective in
improving understanding. Participants detected a subjective improvement in readability
that did not materialize into an objective difference in comprehension.
There are several possible reasons why redrafting had little effect on participants’
understanding in both Study 2 and 3. Perhaps, the comprehension test was not sensitive
enough to detect slight improvement in understanding. Another possible reason that
redrafting may not have had more of an effect on participants in the present study is that
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participants had such high health literacy as demonstrated by their average score of 34.10
in Study 2 and 34.93 in Study 3 out of a possible score of 36 on the S-TOFHLA. Due to
their high levels of health literacy, participants may not have struggled to understand the
original version of the clauses. However, the mean overall comprehension accuracy
score of .15 in Study 2 and .19 in Study 3 suggests comprehension was relatively poor
regardless of which version of the clauses participants read. Perhaps, medical necessity
and claims procedure clauses are too complex to understand even when they are
simplified. On the other hand, participants may not have had enough incentive to expend
the cognitive effort required to understand such complex material. However, participants
who spent more time on the task did not demonstrate greater comprehension in Study 2,
r(81) = -.04, p = .74, or Study 3, r(210) = .07, p = .32.
One of the most plausible reasons for the lack of a redrafting effect is that the
redrafted document was not different enough from the original document. Although
participants who viewed the clauses side by side in a post-hoc study rated the redrafted
clauses as more readable than the original clauses, participants in Study 2 and 3 did not
report that strong a difference (i.e., only one of the two manipulation check measures was
significant in Study 3) and their comprehension scores did not vary by clause condition.
Because it is difficult to reduce word count without changing meaning, I decided to keep
word count similar for the original and redrafted clauses. Perhaps redrafting would have
had more of an effect if the redrafted clause had been shorter than the original clause.
Other researchers have found that shortening text did improve comprehension of medical
consent forms (Mann, 1984; Wogalter et al., 1999).
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There was a significant main effect for clause subject, F(1, 202) = 8.40, p < .01,
ηp2 = .04, such that participants had better knowledge for the claims procedure clauses (M
=.22, SD = .22) than for the medical necessity clauses (M = .15, SD = .25). Consistent
with results from Study 2, this finding suggests that the claims procedure questions may
have been easier than the medical necessity questions. There also was a significant main
effect for knowledge, F(1, 202) = 4.86, p < .05, ηp2 = .02, such that participants had
better declarative knowledge (M =.19, SD = .25) than procedural knowledge (M = .18, SD
= .22). Consistent with results from Study 2, there was a significant 2-way interaction
between clause subject and knowledge type, F(1, 202) = 163.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .45; the
means for the different subscales are presented in Table 15.

Table 15. Average Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales
M

SD

Range

Declarative

.28

.34

-.71-1.00

Procedural

.02

.33

-.71-.86

Declarative

.13

.30

-.78-1.00

Procedural

.31

.26

-.44-1.00

Medical Necessity

Claims Procedure

Again, participants were more accurate when medical necessity questions were directed
at declarative knowledge rather than procedural knowledge, t(1, 209) = 8.83, p < .001, d
= 1.22, and when claims procedure questions were directed at procedural knowledge
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rather than declarative knowledge t(1, 209) = 7.70, p < .001, d = 1.07. It appears that
medical necessity clauses lend themselves to declarative knowledge and claims procedure
clauses lend themselves to procedural knowledge.
As in Study 2, there was a significant 2-way interaction between clause subject
and clause, F(1, 202) = 6.57, p < .05, ηp2 = .03. However, whereas redrafting improved
comprehension for the medical necessity clauses but not for the claims procedure clauses
in Study 2, redrafting improved comprehension for the claims procedure clauses, t(1,
208) = 1.96, p = .05, d =.27, but not for the medical necessity clauses in Study 3, t(1, 208)
= 1.46, p = .15, d =.20. The average scores for the clause subjects and the subscales as a
function of clause are shown in Table 16.

Table 16. Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales as a Function of Clause
Original (N = 104)

Redrafted (N = 106)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Medical Necessity

.18 (.26)

.13 (.24)

Declarative

.29 (.34)

.27 (.33)

Procedural

.07 (.34)

-.02 (.30)

Claims Procedure

.19 (.21)

.25 (.22)

Declarative

.09 (.29)

.16 (.30)

Procedural

.29 (.24)

.33 (.28)

In contrast to Study 2, there was not a 3-way interaction between clause subject,
knowledge type, and clause, F(1, 202) = .09, p = .77, ηp2 = .00. I hypothesized that
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participants in the redrafted clause condition would perform better on all of the
comprehension subscales than participants in the original clause condition would. This
prediction received mixed results in Study 2 and little support in Study 3.
It is difficult to explain the differences in question type as a function of clause for
two reasons: (1) I did not predict that comprehension would vary depending on question
type, and (2) the subscale differences found in Study 3 are not consistent with the
subscale differences found in Study 2. In Study 2, means were in the expected direction
for all the subscales except for the claims procedure procedural questions subscale. In
Study 3, means on the claims procedure subscales were in the expected directions, but
means on the medical necessity subscales were not. The only result that was consistent
with hypotheses was that participants’ performance on the medical necessity procedural
questions subscale in Study 2 was significantly better in the redrafted clause condition
than the original clause condition. In general, redrafting medical necessity and claims
procedure clauses did not improve participants’ comprehension in either study.
Task. I also expected that comprehension would be better for the reading-to-do
task as compared to the reading-to-learn task because the former task promotes deeper
integration of material than the latter. The average scores for the comprehension
subscales as a function of task are shown in Table 17.
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Table 17. Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales as a Function of Task
Reading-to-learn (N = 98)

Reading-to-do (N = 112)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Declarative

.26 (.33)

.30 (.34)

Procedural

.05 (.32)

.00 (.33)

Declarative

.09 (.31)

.15 (.28)

Procedural

.31 (.27)

.31 (.26)

Medical Necessity

Claims Procedure

The same repeated measures ANOVA as above revealed that task produced no main
effect, F(1, 202) = .32, p = .57, ηp2 = .00, or any interactions, F(1, 202) < 3.47, p > .06,
ηp2 < .02. Therefore, the present study found no support for the hypotheses that the
reading-to-do task would improve comprehension or that redrafting would interact with
the reading-to-do task to improve comprehension. Perhaps Duffy and Kabance’s (1982)
broad-based research on readability and comprehension does not generalize to
comprehension of healthcare documents. Healthcare documents may be too complicated
for consumers to understand even when they have a priori knowledge of what
information will be relevant to them. Furthermore, consumers may not realize what
health plan information is important in the face of an impending benefit denial because
they are unfamiliar with the appeals process. Alternatively, the manipulation of task
condition in the present study may have been too weak. Before they read the Health
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Plan, participants either received no instructions or received instructions that their Health
Plan had determined that care they had requested was not medically necessary and that
they would be questioned about the Health Plan. This instruction may not have been
sufficient to motivate participants to engage in deeper integration of the materials.
Participants in the reading-to-do task condition (M = 1833.70 seconds, SD = 2258.80) did
not spend more time completing the study than participants in the reading-to-learn task
did (M = 2408.05 seconds, SD = 8179.00), t(1, 208) = .71, p = .48, d = .10; indeed,
participants in the reading-to-do condition spent about 10 minutes less time on the task
than participants in the reading-to-learn task.
Health History and Insurance Status. I also expected that participants with more
experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate greater comprehension than
participants with less familiarity with the healthcare industry. Participants’ health history
is presented in Table 18.
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Table 18. Participant Health History
Employees

Students

Overall

(N = 93)

(N = 117)

(N = 210)

Poor

3.2%

0%

1.4%

Fair

16.1%

6.0%

10.5%

Good

61.3%

46.6%

53.1%

Excellent

19.4%

47.4%

34.9%

Chronic disease

30.4%

12.2%

20.3%

Hospital (in last year)

16.1%

16.2%

16.2%

Days hospitalized

5.08

2.75

3.79

Doctor (in last 2 years)

85.9%

91.5%

89.0%

Doctors seen

3.21

2.83

2.99

Specialist

53.3%

52.6%

52.9%

Status

More employees reported being in poor or fair health than students did and more students
reported being in good or excellent health than employees did, χ2(1, N = 209) = 8.70, p <
.01. In addition, employees were more likely to have a chronic illness than students
were, χ2(1, N = 207) = 10.54, p < .01. Employees and students reported similar rates of
visiting a hospital in the last year (χ2(1, N = 210) =.00, p = .98), visiting a doctor in the
last two years (χ2(1, N = 209) = 1.64, p = .20), and visiting a specialist (χ2(1, N = 204) =
.01, p = .92). Similarly, employees and students were hospitalized for a similar amount
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of days (t(1, 27) = 1.06, p = .31) and visited a similar number of doctors (t(1, 185) = 1.18,
p = .24). Overall, employees appeared to have slightly more experience with the
healthcare industry than students, which might explain why employees performed better
than students on the medical necessity declarative question subscale, claims procedure
declarative question subscale, and overall comprehension scale.
Several t-tests were run to determine if several measures of health history were
related to overall comprehension. Participants reporting poor or fair health were
compared to participants reporting good or excellent health, participants with a chronic
disease were compared to participants without a chronic disease, participants hospitalized
in the last two years were compared to participants who were not hospitalized in the last
two years, participants who had seen a doctor in the last two years were compared to
participants who had not seen a doctor in the last two years, and participants who had
seen a specialist were compared to participants who had not seen a specialist. The only
effect that was significant was consistent with hypotheses: participants who had seen a
doctor in the last two years had better overall comprehension (M = .20, SD = .18) than
participants who had not seen a doctor (M = .12, SD = .20), t(1, 207) = 2.03, p < .05, d =
.28. Therefore, the present study found very little evidence for the hypothesis that more
experience with the healthcare industry leads to better comprehension of healthcare
documents.
Participants’ insurance status is presented in Table 19.
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Table 19. Participant Insurance Status
Employees

Students

Overall

(N = 93)

(N = 117)

(N = 210)

No insurance

16.1%

4.3%

9.5%

Private insurer

40.9%

29.9%

34.8%

Public insurer

20.4%

7.7%

13.3%

Employer insurer

47.3%

68.4%

59.0%

Supplemental insurance

5.4%

4.3%

4.8%

Years insured

14.12

15.15

14.7

Claims experience

61.3%

53.0%

56.7%

Pre-authorization

40.9%

33.3%

36.7%

Pre-service claim

22.6%

25.6%

24.3%

Post-service claim

28.0%

23.9%

25.7%

Denied coverage

10.8%

6.8%

8.6%

Appealed denial

3.2%

0.9%

1.9%

Employees reported being without insurance more than students, χ2(1, N = 210) = 8.45, p
< .01. Employees were covered by public insurers more than students, χ2(1, N = 210) =
7.28, p < .01, but students were covered by employer insurers more than employees, χ2(1,
N = 210) = 9.51, p < .01. A similar percentage of employees and students were covered
by private insurers (χ2(1, N = 210) = 2.74, p = .10) and had supplemental insurance (χ2(1,
N = 210) =.14, p = .71). Employees and students had insurance coverage for a similar
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amount of years, t(1, 208) = .66, p = .51. Employees and students had a similar amount
of claims experience: pre-authorization (χ2(1, N = 210) = 1.26, p = .26), pre-service claim
(χ2(1, N = 210) = .26, p = .61), post-service claim (χ2(1, N = 210) = .44, p = .51), denied
coverage (χ2(1, N = 210) = 1.01, p = .31), and appealed denial (χ2(1, N = 210) = 1.56, p =
.21). Although employees and students may have had similar insurance coverage, if most
students had coverage through their parents, employees may have had more actual
experience with the insurance industry. This experience might explain why employees
performed better than students on the medical necessity declarative question subscale,
claims procedure declarative question subscale, and overall comprehension scale.
T-tests were run to determine if two measures of insurance status had an influence
on comprehension: participants with insurance (M = .19, SD = .19) were compared to
participants without insurance (M = .14, SD = .15), and participants with some claims
experience (M = .20, SD = .20) were compared to participants without any claims
experience (M = .18, SD = .16). There were no significant effects of insurance status or
claims experience on overall comprehension, ts (1, 208) = 1.37, .74, ps = .17, .46, ds =
.19, .10. Therefore, the present study did not find any evidence that more experience
with the health insurance industry leads to better comprehension of health insurance
documents.
Repeated measure ANOVAs were run to determine if insurance status and claims
experience moderated the 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause. Although
the 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause was not significant for the
uninsured, F(1, 13) = .85, p = .38, ηp2 = .06, the interaction was significant for the
insured, F(1, 182) = 7.12, p < .01, ηp2 = .04. The main effect for clause subject was not
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significant for the uninsured, F(1, 13) = .53, p = .48, ηp = .04, but it was significant for
2

the insured, F(1, 182) = 10.19, p < .01, ηp2 = .05. The main effect for knowledge type
was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 13) = .32, p = .58, ηp2 = .02, but it was
significant for the insured, F(1, 182) = 4.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .03. The 2-way interaction
between knowledge type and participant type was not significant for the uninsured, F(1,
13) = 2.72, p = .12, ηp2 = .17, but it was significant for the insured, F(1, 182) = 6.24, p <
.05, ηp2 = .03. The 2-way interaction between clause subject and knowledge type was not
significant for the uninsured, F(1, 13) = 3.75, p = .08, ηp2 = .22, but it was significant for
the insured, F(1, 182) = 161.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. The lack of a main effect for clause
and the presence of a main effect for participant type was consistent across insurance
status.
Although the 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause was not
significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 83) = .90, p = .35, ηp2 = .01, the
interaction was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 111) = 7.32, p < .01, ηp2
= .06. The main effect for clause subject was not significant for those without claims
experience, F(1, 83) = 1.22, p = .27, ηp2 = .02, but it was significant for those with claims
experience, F(1, 111) = 9.62, p < .01, ηp2 = .08. The main effect for knowledge type was
not significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 83) = .49, p = .49, ηp2 = .01, but
it was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 111) = 4.83, p < .05, ηp2 = .04.
The 2-way interaction between knowledge type and participant type was not significant
for those without claims experience, F(1, 83) = 2.45, p = .12, ηp2 = .03, but it was
significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 111) = 5.18, p < .05, ηp2 = .05. The
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lack of a main effect for clause and participant type and the presence of an interaction
between clause subject and knowledge type was consistent across claims experience.
Similar to results in Study 2, these findings suggest that the positive effect redrafting had
on comprehension of the claims procedure subscales only existed for participants with
health insurance and/or claims experience. Perhaps, when consumers have some
experience with the health insurance industry, their attention is drawn to certain clauses,
such as claims procedure clauses, but not to all health plan information. Once attention is
focused on a clause, redrafting of that clause may improve comprehension slightly.
Appeal Decisions, Procedural Fairness, and Plan Satisfaction. After the first
benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would be to appeal the claim
administrator’s decision through the Health Plan’s appeal process. After the second
benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would be to sue the Health Plan
under Section 502(a) of ERISA. Because these two measures were highly correlated,
r(206) = .66, p < .001, the measures were combined into a single “appeal” measure,
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
I expected more appeals in the strong claim condition and fewer appeals in the
weak claim condition when participants read the redrafted clause, as opposed to the
original clause, and completed the reading-to-do task, as opposed to the reading-to-learn
task. A 4-way ANOVA was performed with clause, task, claim, and participant type as
between-subjects factors and denial as the dependent variable. There was a main effect
for claim, F(1, 193) = 74.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, such that participants in the strong claim
condition (M = 3.82, SD = 1.02) were more likely to appeal the denial than participants in
the weak claim condition (M = 2.56, SD = 1.04). However, there were no other
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significant main effects or interactions. Therefore, the hypothesis that readability and
reading task would interact with claim strength to predict appeals was not supported.
Perhaps, the claim manipulation was so strong that it simply overpowered the relatively
weaker clause and task manipulations.
Similarly, I hypothesized that better comprehension would be associated with an
increased propensity to appeal a strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a
weak claim. The correlation between participants’ overall scores on the comprehension
test and their likelihood of appealing their denied claim depended on the strength of their
claim. There was no correlation between comprehension and propensity to appeal for
participants in the strong claim condition, r(100) = .09, p = .39. However, in the weak
claim condition, the more participants understood the medical necessity and claims
procedure clauses, the less likely they were to appeal a denied benefit, r(109) = -.21, p <
.05. Therefore, the hypothesis that better comprehension would lead to more appropriate
appeal decisions was partially supported.
After the first benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would be to
seek legal counsel before appealing the decision through the Health Plan’s appeal
process. After the second benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would
be to seek legal counsel in order to decide whether they should appeal the Health Plan’s
decision through the legal system. Because these two measures were highly correlated,
r(208) = .48, p < .001, the measures were combined. A 4-way ANOVA was performed
with clause, task, claim, and participant type as between-subjects factors and legal
assistance as the dependent variable. There was a main effect for claim, F(1, 193) =
36.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .16, such that participants in the strong claim condition (M = 3.36,
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SD = .98) were more likely to seek legal assistance than participants in the weak claim
condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.07). It makes sense that participants who thought they had a
more serious claim would seek out legal advice. There was a marginally significant
interaction between clause and claim, F(1, 193) = 3.49, p = .06, ηp2 = .02, and a
significant 3-way interaction between clause, task, and claim, F(1, 193) = 4.73, p <
.05, ηp2 = .02. Although the 2-way interaction between clause and claim was not
significant when participants completed the reading-to-learn task (F(1, 89) = .04, p =
.84, ηp2 = .00; Figure 1), the interaction was significant when participants completed the
reading-to-do task (F(1, 104) = 9.17, p < .01, ηp2 = .08; Figure 2). Participants in the
strong claim condition were more likely to seek legal assistance when they read the
original clause (M = 3.83, SD = .79) than when they read the redrafted clause (M = 3.02,
SD = 1.09).
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Figure 1. Interaction between Clause and Claim for Reading-To-Learn Task
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Figure 2. Interaction between Clause and Claim for Reading-To-Do Task
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In the weak claim condition, participants’ likelihood of seeking legal counsel did not vary
by clause condition (original: M = 2.22, SD = .72; redrafted: M = 2.50, SD = 1.16).
Perhaps, participants in the strong claim condition felt that they had a viable claim and
were more likely to realize they needed a lawyer’s expertise to understand their claim in
the original clause condition, as compared to the redrafted clause condition. Participants
in the weak claim condition probably did not think they needed to seek legal counsel,
regardless of their ability to understand the clauses. No other interactions for seeking
legal counsel were significant.
I also expected participants to appeal the plan administrator’s decision more often
when they perceived the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and when they
were less satisfied with the plan. After the first and second benefit denial letters,
participants rated their agreement with procedural fairness statements concerning control
(α = .82), neutrality (α = .80), trust (α = .83), and social standing (α = .92) and with plan
satisfaction statements (α = .74). Because the reliability coefficient for the procedural
fairness statements and the plan satisfaction statements made after the first and second
benefit denial letters was high (α = .95), the measures were combined into one plan
approval index. The ratings for each of the questions and the combined plan approval
index are presented in Table 20. As reported here, higher scores indicate that participants
had a more positive perception of the Health Plan.
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Table 20. Average Procedural Fairness and Plan Satisfaction Ratings
First Denial Letter

Second Denial Letter

M (SD)

M (SD)

Control

3.04 (.78)

3.00 (.86)

Neutrality

2.98 (.70)

2.94 (.81)

Trust

3.11 (.84)

3.01 (.89)

Social Standing

2.80 (.80)

2.69 (.88)

Plan Satisfaction

3.10 (.53)

3.06 (.67)

Plan Approval Index

3.01 (.62)

3.00 (.71)

Because agreement with the statements was measured on a 5-point scale, the means
indicate that, on average, participants felt neutral about the Health Plan. As predicted, the
more participants felt the Health Plan was procedurally fair and the more participants
were satisfied with the Health Plan, the less likely they were to appeal the denied claim,
r(209) = -.27, p < .001. This result suggests that plan administrators can reduce the
number of appeals filed against them by improving plan characteristics indicative of
procedural fairness, such as control, neutrality, trust, and social standing.
Several t-tests were run to determine whether health history and insurance status
affected plan approval or the propensity to appeal. For health history, participants
reporting poor or fair health were compared to participants reporting good or excellent
health, participants with a chronic disease were compared to participants without a
chronic disease, participants hospitalized in the last two years were compared to
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participants who were not hospitalized in the last two years, participants who had seen a
doctor in the last two years were compared to participants who had not seen a doctor in
the last two years, and participants who had seen a specialist were compared to
participants who had not seen a specialist. There were no significant effects of health
history on plan approval or the propensity to appeal. T-tests were run to determine if two
measures of insurance status had an influence on plan approval or the propensity to
appeal. Participants with insurance were compared to participants without insurance, and
participants with some claims experience were compared to participants without any
claims experience. There were no significant effects of insurance status or claims
experience on plan approval or the propensity to appeal.
Predictors of Decision to Appeal Denied Benefits. I expected claim strength,
comprehension, and plan approval to predict the decision to appeal. A path analysis was
created to determine whether (1) the drafting of the clause, the type of task, and the type
of participant predicted comprehension, (2) the strength of the claim, comprehension, and
the interaction between comprehension and claim strength influenced plan approval, and
(3) plan approval predicted the decision to appeal. Analyses were performed with
procedural fairness and plan satisfaction as separate factors and with procedural fairness
and plan satisfaction combined as one plan approval factor. These analyses yielded
highly comparable findings, so the following section presents results using the plan
approval factor. The results are presented in Figure 3, in which solid arrows indicate
significant relationships and dashed arrows indicate marginally significant relationships.
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Figure 3. Path Model for Decision to Appeal Denied Benefits
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First, I tested whether clause, task, and participant type predicted comprehension.
Employees (ß = .15, p < .05) had greater comprehension than students, but none of the
other independent variables predicted comprehension, R2 = .03, F(3, 206) = 1.84, p = .14.
This finding is consistent with the results of the repeated measures ANOVA performed
above. I next used clause, task, participant type, claim strength, comprehension, and the
interaction between comprehension and claim strength to predict plan approval. When
all variables were included in the equation, participants reported greater plan approval
when they had a weak claim (ß = -.12, p = .08) and less comprehension (ß = -.20, p =
.05), R2 = .05, F(3, 206) = 3.61, p < .05. Participants with a weak claim were probably
less disappointed that the Health Plan denied their claim because the denial seemed more
reasonable. Perhaps, the less participants understood the Health Plan, the more satisfied
they were with it because they did not realize the restrictions the Health Plan placed on its
coverage and appeal process.
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Finally, I tested whether the decision to appeal denied benefits was predicted by
clause, task, participant type, claim strength, comprehension, the interaction between
comprehension and claim strength, and plan approval. As predicted, participants were
more likely to appeal a denied benefit when they had a strong claim (ß = .50, p < .001).
They were less likely to appeal a claim the more they approved of the Health Plan (ß = .22, p < .001). It appears that participants were less likely to challenge denied benefits
when they were satisfied with the Health Plan’s appeal process. In addition, participants
were less likely to appeal a claim the more they comprehended the Health Plan (ß = -.24,
p < .01), especially when they had a weak claim (ß = .21, p < .05), R2 = .34, F(4, 204) =
26.04, p < .001. Thus, improved comprehension reduced the propensity to appeal denied
claims. This effect was more pronounced in the weak claim condition where participants
realized the futility of pursuing a weak claim. Therefore, the hypothesis that better
comprehension would lead to more appropriate appeal decisions was partially supported.
General Discussion
The present study attempted to systematically evaluate the readability and
comprehensibility of the language used in SPDs for healthcare plans in an effort to
determine if SPDs are understandable to the average plan participant. ERISA requires
that plan administrators provide consumers with understandable documents regarding
their healthcare plans. ERISA § 102(a) requires that SPDs "shall be written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently
accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of
their rights and obligations under the plan" (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)). ERISA’s disclosure
requirement recognizes that plan participants cannot effectively protect their rights to
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plan benefits unless they are well-informed. This objective is frustrated if SPDs are
written above the reading ability of the average plan participant.
Comprehension
Readability. The present study examined understanding indirectly through
readability tests and directly through multiple-choice comprehension tests. The present
study focused on two portions of the SPD that have proved particularly litigious—
medical necessity provisions and claims procedures for appealing denied coverage. First
of all, the low inter-rater agreement between experts who pulled out medical necessity
and claims procedure clauses from SPDs for Study 1 demonstrates the difficulty even
trained ERISA experts have identifying the language of these clauses in SPDs (Medill et
al., 2006).
More importantly, Study 1 found that both medical necessity clauses and claims
procedure clauses were written at reading levels beyond those one might expect the
average plan participant to possess. According to the Flesch Reading Ease test, Flesch
Grade Level test, and Fog Index, medical necessity clauses were written at the college
reading level and above the recommended level for business material (Thomas et al,
1975). Claims procedure clauses received better scores on these measures but still
required a college reading level according to the Flesch Reading Ease test and were
above the recommended level for technical material according to the Fog Index (Thomas
et al, 1975). Therefore, similar to medical consent forms, some SPDs clauses appear to
require high levels of reading ability, which many consumers do not possess.
Comprehension. Few studies have explored comprehension of legal rights from
written documents, and the present study is the first to examine comprehension of ERISA
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rights from SPD clauses. Studies 2 and 3 confirmed that actual consumers struggled to
understand these clauses. In both studies, participants’ overall comprehension accuracy
scores (.15 in Study 2 and .19 in Study 3) indicated that respondents made slightly more
correct responses than incorrect responses. In both studies, participants’ performance
was significantly better than chance, but they provided incorrect answers to multiplechoice questions nearly half of the time. These findings are consistent with research that
suggests a high percentage of Americans do not understand how their healthcare plans
operate and, consequently, are not equipped to deal with a complicated appeals process
that often favors plan administrators over plan participants (Edgman-Levitan & Cleary,
1996; Hibbard & Jewett, 1997; Hibbard et al., 1998; Isaacs, 1996; Lubalin & HarrisKojetin, 1999; McCormack et al., 2002). Even though the vast majority of participants in
Studies 2 and 3 had adequate functional health literacy, most participants did not
demonstrate good comprehension of their benefits or their rights and responsibilities
regarding the health plan.
These findings indicate that some SPDs may not comply with ERISA § 102(a)’s
requirement that SPDs “shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant” (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)). Because results from the present study
are based on a small sample of SPDs and a small number of participants, these results
should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the National Adult Literacy Survey
suggests that 20 to 23% of adults are functionally illiterate and another 26% have
marginal literary skills (Kirsh et al., 1993). As a result, the majority of surveyed
institutional review boards require that medical consent forms be written at 5th- to 10thgrade reading levels (Paasche-Orlow et al., 2003). In contrast, many SPDs appear to be
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written at the college reading level, and, more importantly, many consumers do not
understand their content. Because many SPDs require such a high level of reading
ability, they defeat the federal law’s purpose of providing participants and beneficiaries
with full disclosure of important information concerning their health plans. In this age of
consumer-driven healthcare, SPDs are meant to be the primary source of information for
participants in employer-sponsored healthcare plans. ERISA litigation is premised on the
assumption that plan participants are able to use the information in their SPDs to protect
their rights regarding their health plans. Findings from the present study suggest that the
written language of many SPDs may be inadequate to satisfy the legal standard for
participant understanding established under ERISA. Indeed, the Advisory Council on
Employee Welfare and Pension Plans has advised the Secretary of Labor to provide
additional regulatory guidance to help plan administrators prepare understandable and
user-friendly SPDs and to enhance regulatory mechanisms to enforce the requirement
that SPDs be understandable (U.S. Department of Labor, 2005).
Improving Comprehension. In an effort to improve the readability of medical
necessity and claims procedure clauses, I redrafted them by breaking up complex
sentences into simpler sentences, making long words into shorter words, changing the
tone from third to second person, and reducing the technical nature of the documents by
eliminating jargon (Wogalter et al., 1999). In both Studies 2 and 3, these efforts failed to
improve consumers’ comprehension of their health plans. Although participants reported
a subjective difference in the readability of the original and redrafted versions of the
clauses, an objective difference was not found on the comprehension tests. There are
several reasons why redrafting might not have improved comprehension in the present
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study. On the one hand, the highly literate sample may have understood all of the
information in the original version that was “clarified” in the redrafted version. More
likely, the material was too complex to understand, even when redrafted, creating a floor
effect in comprehension scores. Given the length of the study in general and the
difficulty of the comprehension test in particular, fatigue may have been responsible for
poor comprehension of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses. In addition,
participants may not have invested enough cognitive energy into trying to understand
either version of the clauses. Participants may not have had enough motivation to read
the clauses closely due to the simulated nature of the experiment. The possibility that the
redrafted clauses may not have been different enough from the original clauses is
discussed further in the section below on limitations of the present study.
Even though redrafting did not improve comprehension in the present study, the
low comprehension rates found in Study 2 and 3 show that there is plenty of room to
improve the understandability of SPDs. Other studies have demonstrated that it is
possible to improve comprehension by redrafting legal documents (Mann, 1984; Masson
& Waldron, 1994; Wogalter et al, 1999; Young et al., 1990). Plan administrators should
strive to make SPDs as understandable as possible because the law requires that SPDs be
understandable to the average plan participant. ERISA and contract law in general is
premised on the assumption that both parties understand the terms of their agreement.
Theoretically, both parties benefit when they each appreciate their responsibilities under
the contract and realize the limitations of the scope of the contract. One policy
consideration underlying ERISA’s disclosure requirement is that plan administrators
should be held accountable for their compliance with ERISA and the terms of their plans.
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This purpose cannot be realized if plan participants do not understand their benefits or
their rights under their health plans.
The Appeals Process
The purpose of making SPDs more understandable is not simply to decrease the
number of appeals brought, though that would certainly be one benefit, but rather to
increase the number of “appropriate” decisions to appeal. Consumers should accept plan
administrators’ decisions when they have weak claims and appeal denials when they have
strong claims. Thus, in addition to being in compliance with ERISA’s disclosure
requirement, plan administrators may find that more understandable materials result in
more appropriate appeal decisions. The present study is the first to have participants
engage in a simulated health plan appeals process. I wanted to determine if claim
strength, comprehension, and plan approval would influence the propensity to appeal
denied benefits. Appropriately, participants were more likely to appeal a strong claim
than a weak claim and were more likely to seek legal counsel when they had a strong, as
opposed to weak, claim. Participants also reported greater plan approval when they had a
weak claim, probably because it seemed more reasonable that the health plan would deny
their claim. Interestingly, in the reading-to-do task condition, participants with a strong
claim were more likely to seek legal advice when they read the original version of the
clauses. One explanation for this finding is that, in the face of strong claims and poorly
drafted documents, consumers are more likely to feel a lawyer’s services are worth
pursuing.
A big concern in ERISA litigation is that plan participants will hire lawyers too
late in the appeals process. A lawyer can ensure that a plan participant exhausts the
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plan’s administrative appeal procedure before bringing a lawsuit and that plan
administrators have the participant’s strongest evidence before them at the time of the
benefit denial. Findings from the present study suggest that consumers want to hire
attorneys early in the appeal process when they have a strong claim. However,
consumers may be less likely to seek out attorneys in the real world where they have to
find them and pay for their services.
More importantly, the present study found that participants who understood the
health plan were more likely to make the appropriate decision of not pursing weak claims
for denied benefits. The path analysis showed that greater comprehension was associated
with fewer appeals, especially of weak claims. From a business perspective, this finding
provides a convincing argument for investing money into redrafting SPDs. This finding
has important policy implications because it should motivate employers and plan
administrators to improve the readability of their SPDs. By improving the readability of
plan documents, plan administrators could reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits over
plan coverage and, therefore, decrease the administrative costs of sponsoring plans.
Consistent with hypotheses, the present study also found that participants were
less likely to appeal denied claims when they viewed the plan as more procedurally fair
and were more satisfied with the plan. Therefore, participants’ feelings about the health
plan influenced their claiming behavior. Skarlicki and Folger (1997) and Roberts and
Markel (2001) did not find that procedural fairness influenced claiming behavior, but
their research was set in the business context, whereas the present study was set in the
healthcare context. Research has found that patients are more likely to file medical
malpractice suits against providers with poor patient-provider communication (Levinson,
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Roter, Mullooly, Dull, & Frankel, 1997; Moore, Adler, & Robertson, 2000). Results
from the present study suggest that plan participants are more likely to sue their
healthcare insurers when they are dissatisfied with communication from those insurers.
Perhaps, consumers are using their feelings toward their health plan as a substitute
heuristic for putting forth the effort necessary to achieve actual comprehension of the
plan and to assess whether their claim has been properly denied under the terms of the
plan. The present study suggests that plan administrators might be able to reduce the
number of appeals filed against them by improving participants’ perceptions of their
plans. Plan administrators should be highly motivated to reduce the number of appeals
filed against them not only because appeals cost money but because as many as 50% of
plan denials are reversed (Studdert & Gresenz, 2003).
The present study also found that perceptions of procedural fairness and plan
satisfaction were highly correlated. This result is consistent with Murphy-Berman et al.’s
(1999) finding that participants felt better about their health plan when they felt the plan
was procedurally fair. According to the Ethical Fundamental Obligations Report Card
Evaluations program, unfair coverage decisions may lead not only to dissatisfaction with
a health plan but also to withdrawal from that health plan, which can be costly to plan
administrators (Wynia et al., 2004). I was unsure about how comprehension would
influence participants’ perceptions of the health plan. In the present study, increased
comprehension did not lead to greater plan approval, which would have provided plan
administrators with another incentive to redraft their plan documents. Instead, the more
participants understood the health plan, the less participants felt the health plan was
procedurally fair and the less participants were satisfied with the health plan. Although
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speculative, increased comprehension perhaps led to more dissatisfaction because
participants realized the limitations of the health plan’s benefits and the administrative
roadblocks to appealing denied benefits. This result is inconsistent with the Consumer
Assessment of Health Plans Survey, which found that poorer comprehension was
associated with less plan satisfaction (Venus et al., 2003). Perhaps, the more participants
understood the health plan in the face of a pending appeals process, the more they
realized the health plan did not provide all of the information they felt was necessary to
make informed decisions (EBRI/Commonwealth Fund, 2005).
Other Findings
The present study also attempted to improve comprehension by manipulating
task. Consumers engage in reading-to-learn tasks when they attempt to store and retain
information for use in the future, such as when they read their SPDs when they first
receive them. Consumers engage in reading-to-do tasks when they read with specific
objectives and plan to use their newly-acquired information immediately, such as when
they revisit their SPDs once a dispute has arisen. In the present study, some participants
were told, before they read health plan documents, that they would be denied coverage.
This reading-to-do instruction was meant to prompt participants to pay greater attention
to relevant information, process information more selectively, and engage in deeper
integration of information. The reading-to-do task was supposed to encourage text
learning, which promotes deeper understanding of the subject matter and allows
application of newly acquired information to novel situations (Kintsch, 1994). As a
result, I hypothesized that participants in the reading-to-do condition would demonstrate
greater comprehension of the health plan than participants in the reading-to-learn
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condition. The present study found no support for this hypothesis. Based on Duffy and
Kabance’s (1982) reasoning, participants’ comprehension should have improved in the
reading-to-do task because they would have integrated and organized the health plan
information in anticipation of their upcoming appeal. The readability levels required to
understand health plan documents suggest that these documents may by too complicated
for consumers to understand even when they know ahead of time what information will
be important to them. In addition, consumers may be unfamiliar with the appeals process
and not realize what information will be critical in that process. On the other hand, the
present study may not have adequately manipulated task condition, as discussed below in
the section on limitations of the present study. If redrafting facilitates comprehension
only when readers are required to integrate the information, failure of the reading-to-do
manipulation could be partially responsible for the lack of a redrafting effect.
The present study did find differences in comprehension across the different types
of knowledge measured. Declarative knowledge is meaning- and content-based
information stored as semantic concepts, schemata, scripts, or prototypes, and procedural
knowledge operates on the declarative knowledge stored in long- and short-term memory
(Smith, 1994). Participants had better declarative knowledge of medical necessity
clauses and better procedural knowledge of claims procedure clauses. This finding
makes sense given that medical necessity clauses contain content-based information and
claims procedure clauses contain application of concepts. It does not appear that
declarative questions were associated with text memory or that procedural questions were
associated with deeper text learning (Kintsch, 1994). Redrafting medical necessity
clauses to include scenarios and hypothetical problems may improve procedural
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knowledge of this clause, and redrafting claims procedure clauses to highlight and define
critical content areas may improve declarative knowledge of this clause.
I hypothesized that consumers’ health literacy and their experience with the
healthcare industry would influence their ability to understand health plan documents.
Because nearly all of the participants in Studies 2 and 3 had adequate health literacy, I
was not able to determine if higher health literacy was associated with better
comprehension of SPD clauses. The sample in the present study did not represent the 90
million American adults that are functionally illiterate (Kirsh et al., 1993). The study
sample’s health history and insurance status was sufficiently varied to examine the
influence of these factors. Nevertheless, across both studies, more experience with the
healthcare industry did not lead to better comprehension of plan documents. Experience
with the healthcare industry also did not affect plan approval or the propensity to appeal
denied claims. One explanation for these findings is that the measures of healthcare
industry experience in the present study (e.g., health status, doctor visits, insurance
provider, claims experience) were not relevant to the type of knowledge being tested by
the comprehension test or to the skills necessary to appeal denied benefits. In addition,
very few participants in Study 2 (1.2%) and Study 3 (1.9%) could reflect on the
experience of appealing an actual claim. Perhaps, the clauses were too complicated for
individuals, regardless of previous experience with technical healthcare documents.
Interestingly, the positive effects that redrafting had on certain types of knowledge only
existed for participants with health insurance or claims experience. These results suggest
that individuals’ understanding of simplified healthcare documents improves somewhat
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from experience with the health insurance industry. Study 3 sampled both employees and
students.
In general, employees had more experience than students with the healthcare
industry and the insurance industry. This experience may be why employees
demonstrated better comprehension of plan documents than students, especially on the
declarative knowledge subscales. Due to the difference between students and employees’
experience with the healthcare and insurance industry and the difference between
students and employees’ levels of education, it may not be appropriate to generalize
results from student samples to the working population when studying health plan
decision making.
Limitations and Future Studies
One of the biggest weaknesses of the present study, and therefore an area to
improve upon in future studies, was the method of redrafting the SPD clauses. For many
of the same reasons that legal documents are difficult to read (e.g., their length,
complexity, and technical nature; Hartley, 2000; Wogalter et al., 1999), they also are
difficult to redraft. In the present study, SPD clauses were redrafted by breaking up
complex sentences into simpler sentences, making long words into shorter words,
changing the tone from third to second person, reducing the technical nature of the
documents by eliminating jargon, enlarging the font, reordering the text, and indenting
subcategories (Wogalter et al., 1999). These techniques were used because they improve
scores on the Flesch Reading Ease test, Flesch Grade Level test, and Fog Index. A
significant limitation of these measures is that they do not capture some of the commonly
accepted psycholinguistic principles of redrafting such as improving sentence structure
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(English & Sales, 1997; Lieberman & Sales, 1997). Several researchers have been able
to improve comprehension of jury instructions by replacing uncommon words with
common ones, replacing abstract words with concrete ones, avoiding homonyms and
nominalizations, removing prepositional phrases and misplaced phrases, eliminating
negatively modified sentences, and using active voice (Charrow & Charrow, 1979;
Elwork et al., 1977, 1982). One of the most promising redrafting techniques that was not
used in the present study is logical organization of information. For example, two ways
of improving the logical organization of information are using a hierarchical structure,
where high-level concepts are broken down into lower-level components and then
integrated, or an algorithmic structure, where presentation order requires understanding
of one concept for understanding of the next concept (Elwork et al., 1982). Other studies
have successfully improved comprehension for procedural tasks through visual aids such
as flowcharts (Kammann, 1975; Phillips & Quinn, 1993; Wiener et al., 2004).
Although six people made suggestions for improving the readability of each
clause used in the present study, more time and effort could have been spent on redrafting
the clauses. Future studies should have cognitive linguists and educational specialists
involved in the redrafting efforts. Although readability scores are heavily dependent on
word count, I attempted to keep the word count similar for the original and redrafted
versions in order to avoid changing the meaning of the clauses. Future studies should
examine whether shortening the text of SPD clauses—if it is possible to do so without
significantly altering their meaning—improves their comprehension. Shortening text has
been shown to improve comprehension of medical consent forms (Mann, 1984; Wogalter
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et al., 1999). Future studies may want to determine whether shortening texts, improving
readability level, or a combination of both strategies improves comprehension the most.
The task manipulation in the present study also could be improved upon. Duffy
and Kabance (1982) describe reading-to-learn tasks as tasks where individuals attempt to
store and retain information for use in the future and reading-to-do tasks as tasks where
individuals read with specific objectives and plan to use their newly-acquired information
immediately. The only difference between the reading-to-learn and reading-to-do tasks
in the present study was that participants in the reading-to-do task were forewarned that
their claim for benefits would be denied. Even if participants remembered this
instruction, it was probably not sufficient to motivate participants to engage in deeper
integration of the upcoming material. Participants in the present study were asked to take
on the daunting task of reading five to seven type-written pages of a SPD and completing
a 32-question comprehension test. The task manipulation may have produced greater
differences if the study was shorter (e.g., by cutting out the second denial letter and the
second set of plan approval measures) or participants received more compensation for
completing the study.
Future studies should employ more drastic means of manipulating the task, such
as providing a more detailed description of the forthcoming problem, tying compensation
to performance, or increasing accountability. In order to hone in on relevant plan
language, participants might need to be informed of their ailment, the specific actions the
health plan is going to take against them, and their ability to appeal those actions.
Participants could receive this information in the form of a benefit denial letter before
they read the SPD language. Participants also could be told their compensation for

93
participating in the study will depend on whether they successfully complete the
comprehension test or win their appeal. To increase participants’ accountability for their
decision to appeal, participants could have to explain their reasoning to a third-party,
such as a health plan administrator or another health plan participant. In the present
study, participants in the reading-to-do condition did not actually “do” anything.
Consumers probably are more motivated to understand health plan language when they
are reading their own health plan and facing an actual benefit denial, rather than reading a
hypothetical plan and engaging in a simulated appeal of denied benefits. Although the
present study benefited from a controlled design, the simulated appeal may lack the
external validity necessary to generalize its findings to a real-world appeals process with
real consequences (Bornstein & McCabe, 2005). Nevertheless, the present study was a
first attempt at identifying factors, such as procedural fairness and plan satisfaction, that
should be examined when studying appeal decisions in the real world.
The participant sample and the method of surveying participants are also
limitations of the present study. Employee participants in the present study were
recruited through the internet, and all participants completed the study over the internet.
This methodology provided a larger and more geographically diverse sample population.
However, it may have attracted a sample of the population that is disproportionately
health literate. Whereas over 30% of English-speaking Americans have inadequate or
marginal health literacy (Gazmararian et al., 1999; Gazmararian et al., 2003; Parker &
Gazmararian, 2003; Williams et al., 1995), only 3.7% of participants in Study 2 and none
of the participants in Study 3 had inadequate or marginal health literacy. Similarly, more
participants in Study 2 (98.5%) and Study 3 (98.5%) had a high school diploma than the
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national average (84%) according to 2005 U.S. Census data. To give a more accurate
measure of comprehension, future studies should strive to recruit more participants with
inadequate and marginal health literacy and with less education. Future research also
may consider using a different measure of health literacy than the S-TOFHLA.
Although running the study over the internet was realistic because many SPDs are
available to employees on-line, future studies might consider providing participants with
hard copies of health plan documents. Plan participants may receive or print out hard
copies of their SPDs, and plan administrators often mail participants claim denial letters.
Yet, the results would probably be similar to the present study because web-based and
paper-pencil studies generally yield comparable results (Gosling, Vazire, & Srivastava,
2004). Future research also should assess whether participants actually read the study
documents because a national survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates (1996)
found that half of insureds do not read or merely skim materials about their health plans
(as cited by Isaacs, 1996). Future studies should ask participants how carefully they read
the study documents as Wogalter et al. (1999) did and ask participants if they referred
back to the health plan documents when they were completing the comprehension test.
There are several opportunities to determine whether findings from the present
study generalize. The present study assessed the readability of 40 SPDs obtained from
the internet, employees, and attorneys. Although these SPDs represented employers from
across the United States and several types of plans, a larger sample of SPDs would more
accurately reflect the readability of SPDs and allow comparison across different plan
types. A larger sample of SPDs also would have improved the likelihood that the clauses
chosen for Studies 2 and 3 were representative. The clauses selected for redrafting were
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chosen based on their representativeness of the quartile of clauses with poor readability,
two versions of each type of clause were presented, the clauses were all from different
SPDs, and participants read both medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.
Nevertheless, there is a risk that the present study’s findings are idiosyncratic to the
clauses pulled out of the limited number of SPDs collected. Future studies should
evaluate comprehension of more than two versions of the same clause. In addition, the
present study only examined the readability and comprehension of medical necessity and
claims procedure clauses. Future research should look into other clauses. In addition to
examining medical necessity and claims procedure clauses, Medill et al. (2006) collected
Firestone clauses, mental health and substance abuse benefits clauses, pre-existing
condition coverage exclusion clauses, and reimbursement or subrogation clauses. There
was great variability in inter-rater agreement across the different types of clauses, but
there were only small differences in readability across the six topic areas—all clauses
were written at reading levels beyond those one might expect the average plan participant
to possess.
Participants in the present study engaged in a simulated appeals process based on
denial of prospective appeals (i.e., appeals concerning denials of access to services).
Future studies should examine whether perceptions of procedural fairness and plan
satisfaction differ when participants engage in retrospective appeals (i.e., appeals
concerning denial of reimbursement for services already obtained). Results may depend
on whether participants can afford to pay for the procedure if the health plan continues to
deny coverage. The appeal in the present study concerned denial of surgery to remove
varicose veins. Future research should determine whether findings from this study
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generalize to other services that are commonly denied and appealed, such as gastric
bypass, office consultations with psychiatrists, and magnetic resonance imaging tests
(Studdert & Gresenz, 2003). Results may differ depending on whether participants view
the sought after treatment as clinically indicated or as elective or cosmetic.
The present study asked participants what they would do in the event that a health
plan denied them coverage because this line of questioning tapped into the reading-to-do
task manipulation and this study focused on whether individual decision makers would
themselves pursue a claim. Future studies might consider asking participants what a
generic other should do in the same situation. Research has found that perceptions of
fairness depend on whether participants are viewing the world from their own or
another’s perspective (Bègue & Bastounis, 2003; Sutton & Douglas, 2005). Future
studies also should parse apart the relationship between plan approval and comprehension
to determine if positive plan approval influences the decision to appeal more than high
comprehension levels. Instead of using a simulated appeals process, future research
could target individuals who actually have been denied coverage and assess their
perceptions of their health plans. Studies that examine consumers’ actual interactions
with health plans should consider using the Health Care Justice Inventory – Health Plan
(HCJI – HP), which assesses the trust, impartiality, and participation dimensions of
procedural justice (Fondacaro, Frogner, & Moos, 2005).
Conclusion
The present study found that medical necessity and claims procedure clauses in
SPDs are written at the college reading level and, thus, above the reading ability one
would expect the average plan participant to possess. Indeed, poor performance on
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comprehension tests of plan documents confirmed that consumers do not understand
these clauses well. These findings indicate that some SPDs may not comply with ERISA
§ 102(a)’s disclosure requirement. Improving comprehension of SPDs will not be easy,
as demonstrated by the lack of a redrafting effect in the present study. Nevertheless, plan
administrators should be motivated to make their plans more readable based on the
finding that more informed consumers are less likely to pursue futile claims. By reducing
the number of frivolous lawsuits over plan coverage, plan administrators can decrease the
administrative costs of sponsoring plans.
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Appendix A: Selections from Coding Instruction Book
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION LANGUAGE
CODING INSTRUCTION BOOK
Introduction
The purpose of this research study is to measure the readability of the language
used in summary plan descriptions (SPDs) for employer-sponsored health care plans that
are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In
addition to measuring the overall readability of each SPD in the study, the study also
measures the readability of the following selected clauses that are typically found in
health care plan SPDs:
1. Medical necessity clauses.
2. Claim filing and appeal procedure clauses.
3. Firestone clauses.
4. Mental health and substance abuse clauses.
5. Pre-existing condition coverage exclusion clauses.
6. Reimbursement clauses.
Your task is to identify or “code” these clauses in the SPD documents. An
explanation of each clause, and the criteria that you should use to identify each clause,
are described below in the Definitions and Coding Criteria section for each clause.
Coding Methodology
Each SPD document is accompanied by a coding sheet (see Appendix A). As you
identify the relevant clauses in the SPD document, you should:
1. Circle the relevant clause language on the document and indicate the number
of the clause that corresponds to the language (i.e., “1" for language that relates to a
medical necessity clause, “3" for Firestone clause language, etc.).
2. Each time you identify language in the SPD document as part of a coded
clause, write the page number(s) where the language is found under the appropriate
clause heading on the coding sheet.
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This methodology ensures that the research assistant who is responsible for
inputting the coded language into the computer system has two ways to verify the
language to be coded as part of each clause.
Definitions and Coding Criteria
General Instructions
The language that you select and code as part of a SPD clause may be used in
subsequent studies to test the comprehension level of individual readers. To make these
subsequent studies as realistic as possible, you should include as part of the coded
language any relevant topic headings or subheadings used in the document that
correspond to the coded language. In addition, as a general rule you should include the
entire paragraph in which the coded language appears so that a human reader will have
the context necessary to comprehend the significance of the clause language.
Medical necessity clauses represent the one exception to this general rule.
Specific detailed criteria for coding medical necessity clauses are described in the next
section.
1. Medical Necessity Clauses
a. Definition
Medical necessity clauses restrict the type of medical treatment that plans are
obligated to cover.1 A medical necessity clause is an optional plan design feature that is
used to reduce the cost of the health care plan by limiting the scope of coverage to
treatment that is deemed to be medically necessary by the plan administrator.
In general, medical necessity clauses function:
(1) as a general prerequisite for coverage (e.g., charges are considered covered
expenses to the extent that the services and supplies provided are recommended
by a physician and are necessary for the care and treatment of an injury or a
sickness);
(2) as a criterion for providing specific covered services (e.g., hearing aids are
covered only when medically necessary); or

1

David M. Eddy, Benefit Language: Criteria that Will Improve Quality While Reducing Costs,
275 JAMA 650 (1996).
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(3) as a general exclusion from coverage (e.g., services and supplies to the extent
that they are not medically necessary are excluded).2
b. Coding Criteria for Medical Necessity Clauses
Medical necessity clauses require the most detailed coding criteria because SPDs
vary in how medical necessity clauses are presented. In coding a medical necessity
clause, you should determine if the relevant language conveys primary information or
tertiary information. Primary information should be coded as part of the medical
necessity clause. Tertiary information should not be coded as part of the medical
necessity clause.
i) Primary Information
References to medical necessity in the SPD document are to be coded as primary
information if:
(1) the reference is part of an explanation of the prerequisites for coverage;
(2) the reference is part of an explanation of covered services or benefits;
(3) the reference is part of an explanation of the services or benefits that are
excluded from coverage; or
(4) the language is part of a definition or a glossary description of the term
“medical necessity,” “medically necessary,” or similar terminology.
Some SPD documents may contain a general provision stating that all covered
services or benefits must be medically necessary, followed by a detailed list of the types
of services and benefits that are covered by the plan. In this situation, you should code
only the general provision as part of the medical necessity clause and not code the
detailed list of services and benefits that follows the general provision as part of the
medical necessity clause.
Other SPD documents may describe the types of services and benefits that are
covered by the plan, and selectively qualify certain listed services and benefits by
indicating that the particular service or benefit will be covered only if it is medically
necessary. In this situation, you should code these particular services and benefits as part
of the medical necessity clause.
Some SPD documents may describe several options available under the plan
(e.g., PPO, POS, HMO options), with each option containing a medical necessity clause.
In this situation, you should code the medical necessity clause language for each plan
2

CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH
REFORM 125–26 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1995).
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option, even if the SPD document language used to describe the medical necessity clause
for each plan option is identical.
ii) Tertiary Information
References in the SPD document to medical necessity are tertiary and should not
be coded as part of the medical necessity clause if the reference is:
(1) part of an explanation of the requirements of the plan for the pre-authorization
of medical treatment, utilization review procedures, procedures for reviewing the
appropriate length or continuation of a hospital stay, procedures for the
coordination of benefits paid by multiple plans, or case management review
procedures;
(2) included as part of a separate description of prescription drug benefits,
disability plan benefits, dental plan benefits, vision plan benefits, or other welfare
plan benefits that are not medical benefits;
(3) included as part of a description of mental health and substance abuse
benefits;3
(4) included as part of a description of the procedures for claims filing and
appeals of denied claims;4
(5) ad hoc references to medical necessity, or cross-references to other provisions
of the SPD document, already coded as primary and included as part of the
document’s medical necessity clause; or
(6) a cross-reference to medical necessity that is included as part of an
explanation of other federal laws that impact the administration of the plan, such
as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA).

3

In this situation, references to medical necessity are coded as part of the mental health and
substance abuse clause.
4

In this situation, references to medical necessity are coded as part of the claims filing and appeal
procedure clause.
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3. Claim Filing and Appeal Procedure Clauses
a. Definition
Claim filing and appeal procedure clauses inform plan participants of the
procedure the participant must follow to submit a claim for health care plan benefits and
to appeal a claim for health care plan benefits that has been denied by the plan
administrator. The legal source for claim filing and appeal procedure clauses is ERISA
Section 503,5 which provides in relevant part that every plan must “afford a reasonable
opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair
review.”6 Department of Labor regulations implementing Section 503 set forth specific
and detailed requirements for the claims procedures used by group health plans.7
b. Coding Criteria for Claim Filing and Appeal Procedure Clauses
Subject to the exceptions listed below, you should code as part of the claim filing
and appeal procedure clause any language in the SPD document that describes the
procedure the participant must follow to submit a claim for health care benefits and to
appeal a claim for health care benefits that has been denied by the plan administrator.
The following information in the SPD document should not be coded as part of the claim
filing and procedure clause:
(1) a description of the requirements of the plan for the pre-authorization of
medical treatment, utilization review procedures, procedures for reviewing the
appropriate length or continuation of a hospital stay, procedures for the
coordination of benefits paid by multiple plans, or case management review
procedures;
(2) claim filing and appeal procedures that are contained in a separate description
of prescription drug benefits, disability plan benefits, dental plan benefits, vision
plan benefits, or other welfare plan benefits that are not medical benefits;
(3) claim filing and appeal procedures that are unique to mental health and
substance abuse benefits;8 or
(4) references to claims and appeals that are contained in the model statement of
ERISA rights that is required by ERISA Section 104(c) and described in
Department of Labor Regulation 2520.102-3(t)(2).9
5

29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).

6

The complete text of ERISA Section 503 is contained in Appendix B.

7

See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1.

8

In this situation, claim filing and appeal procedures that are unique to mental health and
substance abuse benefits are coded as part of the mental health and substance abuse clause.
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Some SPDs may describe the procedure for filing an initial claim for plan benefits
separately from the procedure for appealing a claim that has been denied. Other SPDs
may describe claim filing and claim appeal procedures in one section. You should code
all of the language in the SPD document that relates to the filing of claims and the appeal
of denied claims as part of the claim filing and appeal procedure clause, whether those
provisions are contained in a single section or in separate sections.
Some SPDs may include a sample form for submitting a claim or appealing a
claim for benefits that has been denied by the plan administrator. You should code any
sample claim forms as part of the claim filing and appeal procedure clause.

9

29 C.F.R. §2520.102-3(t)(2). The text of the Department of Labor’s model statement of ERISA
rights is contained in Appendix C.
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Appendix B: Original and Redrafted Versions of Clauses
Medical Necessity Clause, Plan 1
Original

Redrafted

COVERED BENEFITS

COVERED BENEFITS

A Member shall be entitled to the Covered
Benefits as specified below, in accordance
with the terms and conditions of this
Certificate. Unless specifically stated
otherwise, in order for benefits to be
covered, they must be Medically Necessary.
For the purpose of coverage, HMO may
determine whether any benefit provided
under the Certificate is Medically Necessary,
and HMO has the option to only authorize
coverage for a Covered Benefit performed
by a particular Provider. Preventive care, as
described below, will be considered
Medically Necessary.

A member of this Health Plan is entitled to
the covered benefits as described below. In
order for benefits to be paid for, or covered,
they must be considered “medically
necessary.” The Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) that runs this Plan
decides whether benefits are medically
necessary. If the HMO determines that one
of the benefits listed below is medically
necessary, the benefit will be covered by the
company. In addition, the HMO may only
authorize a particular provider to perform a
covered benefit. Preventive care, as
described below, is always considered
medically necessary.

To be Medically Necessary, the service or
supply must:
• be care or treatment as likely to
produce a significant positive outcome
as, and no more likely to produce a
negative outcome than, any alternative
service or supply, both as to the disease
or injury involved and the Member’s
overall health condition;
• be care or services related to diagnosis
or treatment of an existing illness or
injury, except for covered periodic health
evaluations and preventive and well baby
care, as determined by HMO;
• be a diagnostic procedure, indicated by
the health status of the Member and be as
likely to result in information that could
affect the course of treatment as, and no
more likely to produce a negative
outcome than, any alternative service or
supply, both as to the disease or injury
involved and the Member’s overall
health condition;
• include only those services and supplies

To be medically necessary, services and
supplies must meet all the standards
described below.
• To be medically necessary, the service
or supply must be as likely to have a
significant positive impact on the
member’s illness and the member’s
overall health as any other option. The
service or supply cannot have more of a
negative impact on the member’s illness
and the member’s overall health than any
other option.
• To be medically necessary, the service
or supply must be care or services to
diagnose or treat an existing illness or
injury. The HMO provides an exception
to this rule for care or services related to
periodic health evaluations, preventive
care, or well baby care.
• To be medically necessary, the service
or supply must be a procedure needed to
diagnose the member’s health status.
This procedure must be as likely to
produce information that could affect the

that cannot be safely and satisfactorily
provided at home, in a Physician’s
office, on an outpatient basis, or in any
facility other than a Hospital, when used
in relation to inpatient Hospital Services;
and
• as to diagnosis, care and treatment be
no more costly (taking into account all
health expenses incurred in connection
with the service or supply) than any
equally effective service or supply in
meeting the above tests.
In determining if a service or supply is
Medically Necessary, HMO’s Patient
Management Medical Director or its
Physician designee will consider:
• information provided on the Member’s
health status;
• reports in peer reviewed medical
literature;
• reports and guidelines published by
nationally recognized health care
organizations that include supporting
scientific data;
• professional standards of safety and
effectiveness which are generally
recognized in the United States for
diagnosis, care or treatment;
• the opinion of Health Professionals in
the generally recognized health specialty
involved;
• the opinion of the attending Physicians,
which have credence but do not overrule
contrary opinions; and
• any other relevant information brought
to HMO’s attention.

Inpatient Hospital & Skilled
Nursing Facility Benefits
As an exception to the Medically Necessary
requirements of this Certificate, the
following coverage is provided for a mother
and newly born child:
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course of treatment as any other option.
The procedure cannot have more of a
negative impact on the member’s illness
and the member’s overall health than any
other option.
• To be medically necessary, the service
or supply must include only inpatient
care that cannot be received as safely and
satisfactorily as outpatient care or care
received at home, a physician’s office, or
a facility other than a hospital. Inpatient
care requires an overnight stay, whereas
outpatient care does not.
• To be medically necessary, the service
or supply must be no more costly than
any equally effective service or supply.
The cost must take into account all
medical expenses resulting from the
service or supply.
In determining if a service or supply is
medically necessary, the HMO will consider:
• information about the member’s health
status;
• reports in peer reviewed medical
journals;
• reports and guidelines that are
published by nationally recognized
health care groups and use scientific data
to support their claims;
• professional standards of safety and
effectiveness that are generally applied to
diagnosis, care and treatment in the
United States;
• the opinions of health professionals
who specialize in the health problem at
issue;
• the opinions of the member’s
physicians, whose opinions carry weight
but do not overrule differing opinions;
and
• any other relevant information brought
to the HMO’s attention.
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1. a minimum of 48 hours of
inpatient care in a Participating
Hospital following a vaginal
delivery;
2. a minimum of 96 hours of
inpatient care in a Participating
Hospital following a cesarean
section; or
3. a shorter Hospital stay, if
requested by a mother, and if
determined to be medically
appropriate by the Participating
Providers in consultation with the
mother.

Benefits for Temporomandibular
Joint Disorders (TMJ)
Benefits for TMJ will be provided when
preauthorized by HMO. This includes
diagnostic and surgical treatment of TMJ
that is Medically Necessary as a result of an
accident, a trauma, a congenital defect, a
develop-mental defect, or a pathology.

EXCLUSIONS AND
LIMITATIONS
Exclusions
The following are not Covered Benefits
except as de-scribed in the Covered Benefits
section of this Certificate or by a rider
attached to this Certificate:

Inpatient Hospital & Skilled
Nursing Facility Benefits
As an exception to the medically necessary
requirements described above, the following
coverage is provided for a mother and newly
born child:
1. a minimum of 48 hours of
inpatient care, in a hospital approved
by the HMO, following a vaginal
delivery;
2. a minimum of 96 hours of
inpatient care, in a hospital approved
by the HMO, following a cesarean
section (C-section); or
3. a shorter hospital stay, if requested
by a mother, and if judged medically
appropriate by the health care
provider.

Benefits for Temporomandibular
Joint Disorders (TMJ)
Benefits for TMJ must be authorized by the
HMO before they are received. This is the
case even if the TMJ is medically necessary
due to an accident, a birth defect, a
developmental defect, or a disease.

EXCLUSIONS AND
LIMITATIONS
Exclusions

Except as described above in the Covered
• Cosmetic Surgery, or treatment relating Benefits section or in supplemental
to the consequences of, or as a result of,
materials, the following are not covered
Cosmetic Surgery, other than Medically
benefits:
Necessary Services. This exclusion
• Non-medically necessary cosmetic
includes, but is not limited to, surgery to
surgery or non-medically necessary
correct gynecomastia and breast
treatment to address the consequences of
augmentation procedures, and
an earlier cosmetic surgery. This
otoplasties. Reduction mammoplasty,
includes, but is not limited to, surgery for
except when deter-mined to be Medically
breast enlargement or reduction,
Necessary by an HMO Medical Director,

is not covered.
• Non-medically necessary services,
including but not limited to, those
services and supplies:
1. which are not Medically
Necessary, as determined by HMO,
for the diagnosis and treatment of
illness, in-jury, restoration of
physiological functions, or covered
preventive services;
2. that do not require the technical
skills of a medical, mental health or a
dental professional;
3. furnished mainly for the personal
comfort or convenience of the
Member, or any person who cares for
the Member, or any person who is
part of the Member’s family, or any
Provider;
4. furnished solely because the
Member is an inpatient on any day in
which the Member’s disease or injury
could safely and adequately be
diagnosed or treated while not
confined;
5. furnished solely because of the
setting if the service or supply could
safely and adequately be furnished in
a Physician’s or a dentist’s office or
other less costly setting.

DEFINITIONS
• Medically Necessary, Medically Necessary
Services, or Medical Necessity. Services that
are appropriate and consistent with the
diagnosis in accordance with accepted
medical standards as described in the
Covered Benefits section of this Certificate.
Medical Necessity, when used in relation to
services, shall have the same meaning as
Medically Necessary Services. This
definition applies only to the determination
by HMO of whether health care services are
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abnormal growth of breasts in males, and
large ears.
• Non-medically necessary services,
including but not limited to, the services
described below.
1. Services that are not medically
necessary, as determined by the
HMO, for the diagnosis and
treatment of illness or injury, for the
restoration of body functions, or for
covered preventive services.
2. Services that do not require the
technical skills of a medical, mental
health or dental professional.
3. Services that are delivered mainly
for the personal comfort or
convenience of the member, any
person who cares for the member,
any person who is part of the
member’s family, or any provider.
4. Services that are delivered solely
because the member is an inpatient
when the member’s disease or injury
could safely and adequately be
diagnosed or treated as an outpatient.
5. Services that are delivered solely
because of the setting when the
service or supply could be safely and
adequately provided in a physician’s
office, a dentist’s office, or another
less costly setting.

DEFINITIONS
• Medically necessary, medically
necessary services, or medical necessity.
These are services that are considered
appropriate and consistent with the
diagnosis according to accepted
medical standards as described in the
Covered Benefits section. Medical
necessity, when used in relation to
services, has the same meaning as
medically necessary services. This

Covered Benefits under this Certificate.
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definition applies only to the
determination by the HMO of
whether health care services are
covered benefits under this policy.
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Medical Necessity Clause, Plan 2
Original

Redrafted

SOME TERMS AND
EXPLANATIONS

TERMS AND
EXPLANATIONS

What is ‘Medically Necessary’?

Medically Necessary

The medical plan options pay benefits for
eligible expenses that are considered
medically necessary by the claims
administrator. The claims administrator
considers a treatment, service, or supply as
medically necessary if it is:

The Health Plan will pay for medical
expenses that the Plan’s claims administrator
considers “medically necessary.” A
treatment, service, or supply is medically
necessary if it is:

• Ordered and approved by a licensed
physician
• Reasonably required for the diagnosis
or treatment of a medical symptom or
condition
• A treatment that is economical, safe,
and provided in a manner and setting
consistent with generally accepted
United States medical standards
• Not primarily for the convenience of
the patient or the health care provider
• The most appropriate level of
treatment, service, or supply that can be
safely provided. (With respect to
hospitalization, acute care as an inpatient
is judged to be necessary based on the
type of services the patient is receiving
or the severity of the patient's condition.
It also means that safe and adequate care
cannot be received as an outpatient or in
a less intense medical setting.)
• Not educational, vocational,
experimental, or investigational in nature
except for individuals with diabetes. The
plan provides for education about
diabetes.
• Not specifically excluded by the plan.
When you are hospitalized, your provider
and the claims administrator determine how
long your hospital stay is medically

• ordered and approved by a licensed
physician;
• reasonably required to diagnose or treat
a medical symptom or condition;
• cost-effective and safe;
• generally accepted according to
national medical standards;
• the most appropriate level of treatment,
service, or supply that can be safely
provided;
• Inpatient care requires an overnight
stay, whereas outpatient care does
not. Inpatient care is only medically
necessary if the same care cannot be
received as an outpatient or in a less
intense medical setting than a
hospital. This judgment will be based
on the type of services the patient is
receiving or the severity of the
patient's condition.
• not for the purpose of education or an
experiment (except for educating patients
about their diabetes);
• not mainly for the convenience of the
patient or the health care provider; and
• not specifically listed in this Plan under
the section Medical Expenses that are
Not Covered.
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necessary. Even though your physician or
other health care provider prescribes, orders,
recommends, or approves a service or
supply, it is not automatically considered
medically necessary. This rule applies even
if the service or supply is not listed in this
guide as an ineligible expense.
Consequently, pre-certification of expenses
is essential to determine eligibility for
benefits.
Hospital inpatient services are medically
necessary if they cannot be safely provided
to you as an outpatient.

Hospitalization
Hospital inpatient services are medically
necessary if they cannot be safely provided
to you as an outpatient.
When you are in the hospital, your health
care provider and the claims administrator
decide how long your hospital stay is
medically necessary. Even though your
health care provider prescribes or
recommends a service or supply, it is not
automatically considered medically
necessary. This rule applies even if the
service or supply is not specifically listed in
this Plan under the section Medical Expenses
that are Not Covered. The best way to make
sure the services and supplies you receive
will be covered is to ask the claims
administrator before you receive them.

Adult physicals, newborn baby care and
childhood immunizations that you receive
from a network provider are considered
medically necessary. Maternity hospital
stays for mothers and newborn children are
considered medically necessary for at least
48 hours following a normal vaginal delivery Preventative Care
or 96 hours following a cesarean birth.
From Network Providers
Out-of-network services and supplies
Network providers are those doctors that
provided to a newborn child are considered
have an agreement to provide care to patients
medically necessary if they:
with this Plan and be paid by this Plan for
“medically necessary” services.
• Meet all the requirements listed in the
Eligible Medical Expenses section.
Adult physicals that you receive from a
network provider are considered medically
• Are provided to treat a diagnosed
sickness or injury (including a congenital necessary.
defect or birth abnormality).
Newborn baby care and childhood
immunizations from a network provider are
considered medically necessary. Hospital
EMERGENCY CARE AND stays for mothers and newborns are
considered medically necessary for at least
HOSPITALIZATION
48 hours following a normal vaginal delivery
Eligible Medical Expenses
or 96 hours following a cesarean section (Csection).
• Ambulance service to a local facility
for a life-threatening condition or a
From Out-of-Network Providers
condition that could cause serious harm
Out-of-network services and supplies
to your body
provided to a newborn child are considered
(The medical plan options also cover air medically necessary if they:
ambulance service to the nearest
• Meet all the criteria listed in the section
appropriate facility when this service is
on Covered Medical Expenses.
medically necessary. There is no
coverage under any of the medical plan
• Are provided to treat a diagnosed
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options for ambulance use when there is
no emergency.)
• Medically necessary surgery that
results from a previous cosmetic surgery
(Cosmetic surgery performed mainly to
change a person's appearance is not an
eligible expense.)
• Educational expenses related to
diabetes, when medically necessary and
prescribed by a physician and approved
by the claims administrator
• Infertility services, including diagnostic
services to determine the cause of
infertility, and medical procedures
required to correct a physical condition
causing infertility
• Further, administrative fees related
to non-medically necessary infertility
services, such as egg and sperm
donor search fees and travel
expenses, also are not eligible.
• Temporomandibular joint (TMJ)
syndrome, including medically necessary
initial surgical consultation and surgical
treatment of dysfunction of the
temporomandibular joint. (The medical
plan options do not cover therapy [before
or after surgery], appliances or the
shortening or lengthening of the maxilla
or mandible for cosmetic purposes or for
correction of malocclusion.)

Ineligible Medical Expenses
• Charges for services or supplies that are
not medically necessary
• Expenses related to court-ordered
treatment, unless certified as medically
or psychologically necessary
• Expenses related to infertility
administration fees that are not medically
necessary, such as egg and sperm costs
and donor search fees

sickness or injury, including a birth
defect.

EMERGENCY CARE AND
HOSPITALIZATION
Covered Medical Expenses
• Ambulance service to a local hospital
for a life-threatening condition or a
condition that could cause serious harm
to the patient’s body.
• Helicopter ambulance service to the
nearest hospital that is equipped to
handle the patient’s condition when this
service is medically necessary.
• There is no coverage for any ambulance
service when there is no emergency.
• Medically necessary surgery that
results from a previous cosmetic surgery
• Cosmetic surgery performed mainly
to change the way a person looks is
not covered.
• Educational expenses for patients with
diabetes, when prescribed by a doctor
and approved by the claims administrator
• Infertility services
• When a couple cannot get pregnant,
the Plan will cover tests to determine
the cause of infertility and medical
procedures to fix it
• Expenses related to non-medically
necessary infertility services, such as
egg and sperm donor search fees and
travel expenses, are not covered.
• Temporomandibular joint (TMJ)
syndrome, including medically necessary
surgery.
• The Plan does not cover therapy
before or after surgery, devices or
procedures to shorten or lengthen the
jaw bones for cosmetic or
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orthodontic purposes.

GLOSSARY
Medically necessary In general, services or
supplies that meet the following criteria:
• Are appropriate and necessary for the
symptoms, diagnosis or treatment of the
medical condition, disease, injury or
illness.
• Are provided for the diagnosis or direct
care and treatment of the medical
condition, disease, injury or illness.
• Meet the standards of sound medical
practice in the medical community in the
service area and that, if omitted, would
adversely affect the patient's medical
condition.

Medical Expenses that are Not
Covered
• Charges for services or supplies that are
not medically necessary
• Expenses related to court-ordered
treatment, unless the claims
administrator decides the expenses are
medically or psychologically necessary
• Expenses related to infertility expenses
that are not medically necessary, such as
egg and sperm costs and donor search
fees

GLOSSARY

• Are not primarily for the convenience
of the patient or health care provider.

Medically Necessary

• Are the most appropriate level or
amount that can safely be provided.

In general, services or supplies are medically
necessary if they:

The medical and dental plans pay benefits
for services and supplies that are considered
medically necessary, as determined by the
plan administrator. The fact that a physician
or other health care provider prescribes or
orders the service or supply does not make it
a medically necessary, eligible expense.

• are appropriate and necessary and are
provided to diagnose or treat the injury
or illness;
• meet the standards of medical practice
in the local medical community;
• would negatively affect the patient's
medical condition if not provided;
• are not provided mainly for the
convenience of the patient or health care
provider; and
• are provided at the most appropriate
level that is safe.
The Plan pays for services and supplies that
the claims administrator deems medically
necessary. The fact that a health care
provider prescribes or orders the service or
supply does not, by itself, make it medically
necessary.
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Claims Procedure Clause, Plan 1
Redrafted

Original

CLAIMS INFORMATION
CLAIMS AND APPEALS
AND APPEAL PROCEDURES Getting Services Paid for by the
How to Obtain Benefits

Plan

When you receive Covered Services, a claim
must be filed for you to obtain benefits.
Network Providers will file claims for you. If
you need to submit the claim yourself for
Covered Services (such as claims for
treatment by an Out-of-Network Provider),
you should use a claim form.

When you receive services that are covered
by the Plan, a claim must be filed for the
Plan to pay for the services. Health care
providers who have network agreements to
work with the Plan will file claims for you.
When you receive services from an out-ofnetwork provider, you need to submit the
claim form yourself. The Plan provides a
claim form.

These claim forms are available in your
human resources department or on the human
resources page of the Intranet. You can also
obtain forms by calling the Customer Service
Center at the number on the back of your
insurance card. The claim form, as well as
your insurance card, provides the correct
address to where claims should be sent.

You can get claim forms from your
employer’s human resources department or
website. You can also obtain forms by
calling the Customer Service Center at the
number on the back of your insurance card.
The claim form and your insurance card
both provide the address where claims
should be sent.

Medical Claim Submission
A claim form must be submitted to the Plan’s
Claims Administrator at the address that is
indicated on the back of your insurance card.
Claims must be submitted within 90 days of
receiving Covered Services and must include
sufficient data to determine what benefits are
covered by the Plan.
Failure to submit a claim within 90 days will
not reduce a benefit if you or your Provider
can show that the claim was submitted as
soon as reasonably possible. However, claims
first submitted more than 180 days after the
date of the Covered Service may be denied
for lack of timely filing.

Payment Determinations on Initial
Claims
The Plan endeavors to provide quick

Medical Claim Submission
A claim form must be mailed to the Plan’s
Claims Administrator at the address on your
insurance card. Claims must be submitted
within 90 days of receiving services and
must include enough information for the
administrator to determine which of the
services you received are covered by the
Plan.
If it takes you longer than 90 days to submit
a claim, you can still get benefits. For this to
happen, you or your health care provider
must show that the claim was submitted as
soon as it was reasonably possible. If it
takes you longer than 180 days to submit
your claim, your benefits may be denied for
not filing in a timely manner.
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processing of all health insurance Claims.
There are two types of Claims that may be
filed under the Plan: Pre-service Claims and
Post-service Claims. A Pre-service Claim is a
request for benefits prior to receipt of
treatment or a Pre-authorization request as
required under the Plan (see the
Preauthorization section of the Plan for
benefits requiring Pre-authorization). A Postservice Claim is a Claim for benefits after the
treatment has already been rendered. As
illustrated below, Pre-service Claims and
Post-service Claims are treated differently by
the Plan. Moreover, the Plan will treat Preservice Claims differently based upon
whether the Claim is an Urgent Care Claim.
For purposes of this Claims Information and
Appeal Procedures section of this Summary
Plan Description, an Urgent Care Pre-service
Claim is any Claim for medical care or
treatment with respect to which the
application of the time periods for making
non-urgent care determinations could
seriously jeopardize the life or health of the
claimant or the ability of the claimant to
regain maximum function or, in the opinion
of a physician with knowledge of the
claimant’s medical condition, would subject
the claimant to severe pain that cannot be
adequately managed without the care or
treatment that is the subject of the Claim.
Determinations of Urgent Care Pre-service
Claims will be made by the Claims
Administrator as soon as possible, taking into
account the medical necessity, and
notification of such determination shall be
given to the Member not later than 72 hours
from the time the Urgent Care Pre-service
Claim is received unless the Member failed to
provide sufficient information in order for the
Claims Administrator to determine whether,
or to what extent, benefits are covered or
payable under the Plan. In the case of such a
failure, the Claims Administrator shall notify
the claimant as soon as possible, but not later
than 24 hours after receipt of the Claim, of
the specific information necessary to

Decisions about Claims
The Plan tries to process all claims quickly.
There are two types of claims that may be
filed under the Plan.
• A Pre-service Claim is a request for
benefits prior to receiving treatment, such
as a pre-authorization request.
• A pre-authorization request is a request
that the Plan determine whether a
proposed service is covered and is
medically necessary. For some types of
services, a pre-authorization request is
required.
• A Post-service Claim is a claim for
benefits after the treatment has been
received.
• As described below, Pre-service Claims
and Post-service Claims are treated
differently by the Plan. The Plan treats Preservice Claims differently depending on
whether the claim is for care that is needed
urgently or not.
Urgent Care Pre-service Claims
An Urgent Care Pre-service Claim is any
claim for medical care that is needed
immediately. Urgent Care Pre-service
Claims are processed more quickly than
claims for non-urgent care for several
reasons. In a doctor’s opinion, a delay
might endanger the health of the patient,
reduce the patient’s chance of a full
recovery, or subject the patient to severe
pain that cannot be managed without the
requested services.
Urgent Care Pre-service Claim decisions
will be made by the Claims Administrator
as soon as possible. The Claims
Administrator will consider the medical
necessity of the service. You will learn of
the Claims Administrator’s decision within
72 hours from the time the claim was
received. If you did not give the Claims
Administrator enough information to

complete the Claim. The claimant will be
given 48 hours after receipt of the notice to
provide the requested information. Within 48
hours of its receipt of the requested
information, the Claims Administrator shall
notify the claimant of its determination. If the
claimant fails to timely provide the requested
information, the Claims Administrator will
notify the claimant of its determination
within 48 hours after the expiration of the
time to provide the information.
If a claimant files an Urgent Care Pre-service
Claim improperly, the Claims Administrator
will notify the claimant of the improper filing
and how to correct it as soon as possible (but
not later than 24 hours) after the failure is
discovered. This notice may be oral, unless
written notification is requested by the
claimant.
Non-urgent care Pre-service Claims will be
determined by the Claims Administrator
within a reasonable period of time
appropriate to the medical circumstances, and
notification of such determination shall be
given to the Member not later than 15 days
from the time the non-urgent care Pre-service
Claim is received. This 15-day period may be
extended if the Claims Administrator
determines that the extension is necessary
due to matters beyond the control of the Plan
and properly notifies the Member of such
extension prior to the expiration of the initial
15-day period. The extension notice shall
include the circumstances requiring the
extension and the expected date of the
determination. If the extension is requested
because of the need for additional
information, the Claims Administrator will
notify the claimant of the needed information
within the initial 15-day period and pend the
Claim until the information is received. The
claimant will be given 45 days after receipt of
the notice to provide the requested
information. Within 15 days of its receipt of
the requested information, the Claims
Administrator shall notify the claimant of its
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determine which of the benefits you want
are covered by the Plan, it might take
longer.
If you did not provide enough information,
the Claims Administrator will notify you as
soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours
after receiving the claim. The Claims
Administrator will tell you what information
is needed to complete the claim. You will
have 48 hours to provide the requested
information. After you provide the
requested information, you will be notified
of the Claims Administrator’s decision
within 48 hours. If you do not provide the
requested information in time, you will be
notified of the Claims Administrator’s
decision within 48 hours after the requested
information was due.
If you do not file an Urgent Care Preservice Claim correctly, the Claims
Administrator will notify you of the
problem and tell you how to fix it. The
Claims Administrator will contact you as
soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours
after the problem is discovered. Notice of
the problem may only be given to you
verbally, unless you request written notice.
Non-urgent Care Pre-service Claims
Non-urgent Care Pre-service Claim
decisions will be made by the Claims
Administrator within a reasonable period of
time depending on the medical
circumstances. You will learn of the Claims
Administrator’s decision no later than 15
days from the time the claim was received.
This 15-day period may be extended if the
Claims Administrator determines that it is
necessary due to matters beyond the Plan’s
control. If an extension is needed, you will
be notified before the initial 15-day period
is over. The notice will inform you of the
reasons for the extension and the date the
Claims Administrator expects to make a
decision about your claim. If the Claims
Administrator needs more information to

determination. If the claimant fails to timely
provide the requested information, the Claims
Administrator will notify the claimant of its
determination within 15 days after the
expiration of the time to provide the
information.
If the claimant files a non-urgent care Preservice Claim improperly, the Claims
Administrator will notify the claimant of the
improper filing and how to correct it as soon
as possible (but not later than 5 days) after
the failure is discovered. This notice may be
oral, unless written notification is requested
by the claimant.
If a Member has already received approval
for a course of treatment to be provided over
a specified number of treatments or a
specified period of time, any cutback in that
course of treatment is considered under these
rules as an adverse benefit determination
entitling the Member to utilize the Plan’s
appeals procedures outlined below. Any such
denial will be done sufficiently in advance of
the cutback to allow the Member to appeal
and obtain a determination on review before
the benefit is reduced.
If a Member has already received approval
for a course of treatment and the Member
desires to extend the treatment beyond the
treatment already approved, such extension
will be treated as a new Claim, but the Plan
shall notify the Member of its determination
regarding Urgent Care benefits as soon as
possible, taking into account the medical
necessity, not later than 24 hours after receipt
of the request. However, if a request for
extended treatment involving Urgent Care is
not made at least 24 hours prior to the end of
the already approved treatment, the request
will instead be treated as an Urgent Care
Claim, as discussed above.
Post-service Claims will be determined by
the Claims Administrator within a reasonable
period of time, and notification of such
determination shall be given to the Member
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make a decision, the Claims Administrator
will notify you within the initial 15-day
period. The Claims Administrator will hold
the claim until the requested information is
received. After the Claims Administrator
tells you what information is missing, you
have 45 days to provide the requested
information. After you provide the
requested information, you will be notified
of the Claims Administrator’s decision
within 15 days. If you do not provide the
requested information in time, you will be
notified of the Claims Administrator’s
decision within 15 days after the requested
information was due.
If you do not file a Non-urgent Care Preservice Claim properly, the Claims
Administrator will notify you of the
problem and tell you how to fix it. The
Claims Administrator will contact you as
soon as possible, but no later than 5 days
after the problem is discovered. Notice of
the problem may only be given to you
verbally, unless you request written notice.
If you already have received approval to
receive a certain number of treatments or to
receive treatment for a certain length of
time, any reduction in your treatment is
considered a benefit decision against you. If
the Plan makes a benefit decision against
you, you are entitled to appeal the Plan’s
decision, as described below. If the Plan
decides to reduce your treatment, the Plan
will inform you of its decision in time for
you to appeal the decision and hear back
before the reduction takes place.
If you already have gotten permission to
receive a certain number of treatments or to
receive treatment for a certain length of time
and you request more treatment, your
request will be treated as a new claim. The
Plan will notify you of its decision about
Urgent Care Claims as soon as possible.
The Claims Administrator will take into
account the medical necessity of the
services, and will notify you no later than 24

not later than 30 days after receipt of the
Claim. The Plan may extend this 30-day
period by 15 days if the Claims Administrator
determines that the extension is necessary
due to matters beyond the control of the Plan
and properly notifies the Member of the
extension prior to the expiration of the initial
30-day period. The extension notice shall
include the circumstances requiring the
extension and the expected date of the
determination. If the extension is requested
because of the need for additional
information, the Claims Administrator will
notify the claimant of the needed information
within the initial 30-day period and pend the
Claim until the information is received. The
claimant will be given 45 days after receipt of
the notice to provide the requested
information. Within 15 days of its receipt of
the requested information, the Claims
Administrator shall notify the claimant of its
determination. If the claimant fails to timely
provide the requested information, the Claims
Administrator will notify the claimant of its
determination within 15 days after the
expiration of the time to provide the
information.
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hours after receiving your request. If you
want more treatment involving urgent care,
you have to make your request at least 24
hours before the already approved treatment
is finished. Otherwise, your request will be
treated as an Urgent Care Claim, as
described above.
Post-service Claims

Post-service Claims will be decided by the
Claims Administrator within a reasonable
period of time, but no later than 30 days
after your claim is received. This 30-day
period may be extended by 15 days if the
Claims Administrator determines that it is
necessary due to matters beyond the Plan’s
control. If an extension is needed, you will
be notified before the initial 30-day period
is over. The notice will tell you the reasons
for the extension and the date the Claims
Administrator expects to make a decision
about your claim. If the Claims
Administrator needs more information to
make a decision, the Claims Administrator
will notify you within the initial 30-day
period. The Claims Administrator will hold
the claim until the requested information is
received. After the Claims Administrator
If your Claim is denied by the Claims
Administrator, the denial notice will provide: tells you what information is missing, you
have 45 days to provide the requested
• the specific reason(s) for the denial, and, information. After you provide the
if applicable, either the specific internal
requested information, you will be notified
rule, guideline, protocol or other similar
of the Claims Administrator’s decision
criterion (if any) relied upon in making
within 15 days. If you do not provide the
the denial, or a statement that the rule,
requested information in time, you will be
guideline, protocol or other similar
notified of the Claims Administrator’s
criterion that was relied upon in making
decision within 15 days after the requested
the denial and that a copy of such rule,
information was due.
guideline, protocol or other similar
If your claim is denied by the Claims
criterion will be provided free of charge
Administrator, the denial notice will provide
upon request
you with the information described below.
• references to the part of the Plan on
• The denial notice will inform you of
which the denial is based
the specific reasons for the denial. If
• a description of any additional material
applicable, the denial notice will either
or information necessary for you to
include the rule or protocol on which the
perfect your Claim and an explanation
denial is based, or it will state that the

why such material or information is
necessary
• appropriate information as to the steps
to be taken if you desire to appeal the
denial, including notice of applicable time
limits, and a statement regarding your
right to bring suit under Section
502(a) of ERISA following an adverse
benefit determination on review
• if the denial is based on a medical
necessity or experimental treatment or
similar exclusion or limit, an explanation
of the scientific or clinical judgment for
such denial that applies the terms of the
Plan to your medical circumstances, or a
statement that such explanation will be
provided free of charge upon request
• a description of the expedited review
process for Urgent Care Pre-service
Claims.
The Claims Administrator may orally provide
you the above information if your Urgent
Care Pre-service Claim is denied if written
notification is subsequently furnished to you
not later than 3 days after the oral
notification.

Appeals of Plan Determinations,
Including Time Limits
If you have a question about benefits, you
may contact the Customer Service Center at
the number listed on the back of your
insurance card. Most issues can be resolved
by the Customer Service Center and do not
require a formal appeal.
If you (or, a Provider) disagree with a benefit
determination made by the Plan about
coverage, payment or a Preauthorization
request for services, you may request a
formal Plan Review (“Plan Review”) within
180 days after you receive notification of an
adverse benefit determination. Requests
received after 180 days will not be
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rule or protocol used to make the
decision will be provided free of charge
if requested.
• The denial notice will refer you to the
part of the Plan on which the denial is
based.
• The denial notice will describe any
additional information that is necessary
for your claim to be complete. It will
explain why such information is
necessary.
• The denial notice will tell you the steps
to take if you want to appeal the denial
and the applicable time limits. The
denial notice also will include a
statement of your right to sue under
Section 502(a) of the Employee
Retirement Income Securities Act
(ERISA) if the Claims Administrator
reviews your appeal of denied benefits
and again denies your claim.
• The denial notice will tell you if the
denial is based on a determination that
the treatment is not medically necessary,
is experimental or falls under a similar
exclusion or limitation. The denial
notice will either explain the scientific
or clinical reasons for the denial,
applying the terms of the Plan to your
circumstances, or it will state that an
explanation will be provided free of
charge if requested.
• The denial notice will describe the
appeal process for Urgent Care Preservice Claims. If your Urgent Care Preservice Claim is denied, the Claims
Administrator may notify you of the
above information verbally, as long as
you are given written notification no
more than 3 days later.
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considered. All requests should be made in
writing to the Claims Administrator;
provided, however, that requests regarding
Urgent Care Claims may be made orally to
the Claims Administrator. Plan Reviews of
Pre-service Claims are decided by the Plan’s
Appeals Committee. Plan Reviews of Postservice Claims are decided by the Medical
Director (or, his designee).

Appealing Plan Decisions
If you have a question about benefits, you
may contact the Customer Service Center at
the number listed on the back of your
insurance card. Most questions can be taken
care of by Customer Service and do not
require a formal appeal.

If you (or your health care provider)
disagree with a benefit decision made by the
Plan about coverage or pre-authorization,
• to submit written comments, documents, you may request a formal “Plan Review.”
You need to request a Plan Review within
records and other information relating to
180 days after you receive notice that the
the Claim for benefits and for the Plan
Review to take into account all submitted Plan has made a benefit decision against
you. Requests for Plan Review that are
materials regardless of whether such
materials have already been submitted or received after 180 days will not be
considered. All requests should be made in
considered during the initial benefit
writing to the Claims Administrator, except
determination
Urgent Care Claim requests. Urgent Care
• upon request and free of charge, access
Claim requests may be made verbally to the
to and copies of all documents, records
Claims Administrator. Plan Reviews of Preand other information relevant to the
service Claims are decided by the Plan’s
Claim for benefits
Appeals Committee. Plan Reviews of Post• for a Plan Review that does not take into service Claims are decided by the Medical
Director or his designee.
account the initial adverse benefit
determination, and that is conducted by
If you request a Plan Review, you have the
an appropriate named fiduciary who is
rights described below.
neither the individual who made the
• You have the right to submit written
initial benefit determination nor the
comments, documents and other
subordinate of such individual
information relating to your claim. The
• if the Claim is based in whole or in part
Plan Review must take into account all
on a medical judgment, including
submitted materials, even if the
determinations with regard to whether a
materials have already been submitted
particular treatment, drug or other item is
or considered during the initial benefit
experimental, investigational or not
decision.
medically necessary or appropriate, a
• You have access to and can get copies
health care professional who has the
of all documents and other information
appropriate training and experience in the
regarding your claim free of charge if
field of medicine will be consulted (and
requested.
that the consulted health care professional
will not be an individual who was
• The Plan Review must not take into
consulted during the initial benefit
account the initial benefit decision. The
determination nor a subordinate of such
Plan Review must be conducted by an
individual)
appropriate named fiduciary who cannot
be the individual who made the initial
• to obtain the identification of the

If a Plan Review is requested, the claimant
shall have the following rights:
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medical or vocational experts whose
advice was obtained on behalf of the Plan
in connection with a claimant’s adverse
benefit determination, without regard to
whether the advice was relied upon in
making the benefit determination.
The determination regarding the appeal of a
non-urgent care Pre-service Claim or a Postservice Claim shall be communicated to the
claimant (and/or relevant Providers, if
applicable) within a reasonable period of time
appropriate to the medical circumstances, but
not later than 30 days after the appeal was
received. The determination regarding the
appeal of a Urgent Care Pre-service Claim
shall be communicated to the claimant
(and/or relevant Providers, if applicable) as
soon as possible, taking into account the
medical necessity, but not later than 72 hours
after the appeal was received.
In regard to Post-service Claims only, if a
claimant disagrees with the Plan Review
determination made by the Medical Director
he may appeal that decision to the Plan’s
Appeals Committee within 180 days after
receipt of the denial. Requests received after
180 days will not be considered. All requests
should be in writing to the Claims
Administrator, who will deliver the
claimant’s request to the Plan’s Appeals
Committee. While a Claim is on appeal to the
Plan’s Appeals Committee, a claimant is
entitled to the same rights as during the first
appeal. This includes the right to have a
person who was not the person who reviewed
(or who was a subordinate of the person who
reviewed) the initial Claim or the first appeal
make a determination on the claimant’s latest
appeal, and to a review by the Plan’s Appeals
Committee that provides no deference to any
earlier determinations. Additionally, if a
claimant’s request involves a medical
judgment, health care professionals who were
not previously consulted and who are not the
subordinates of any previously consulted
health care professional will be consulted by

benefit decision or that person’s
assistant.
• If the claim is based on a medical
judgment that the treatment was
experimental, investigational or not
medically necessary or appropriate, a
health care professional who has the
appropriate training must be consulted.
The health care professional that is
consulted cannot be an individual who
was consulted during the initial benefit
decision or that person’s assistant.
• You have the right to obtain the names
of the medical or vocational experts
whose advice was obtained by the Plan
in connection with your benefit
decision. You have this right whether or
not the advice was actually used in
making the decision.
You (and/or the relevant health care
providers) will be notified of the Plan’s
decision regarding the appeal of a Nonurgent Care Pre-service Claim or a Postservice Claim within a reasonable period of
time. A “reasonable period” depends on the
medical circumstances, but is no later than
30 days after the appeal was received. You
(and/or the relevant health care providers)
will be notified of the Plan’s decision
regarding the appeal of an Urgent Care Preservice Claim as soon as possible. The
amount of time depends on the medical
necessity of the services, but will be no later
than 72 hours after the appeal was received.
In regard to Post-service Claims only, if you
disagree with the Plan Review decision
made by the Medical Director, you may
appeal that decision to the Plan’s Appeals
Committee within 180 days after you
receive notice that your request has been
denied. Requests received after 180 days
will not be considered. All requests should
be made in writing to the Claims
Administrator. The Claims Administrator
will deliver your request to the Plan’s

the Plan’s Appeals Committee. The Plan’s
Appeals Committee’s determination shall be
communicated to the claimant within a
reasonable period of time not to exceed 30
days after the appeal was received.
If your Claim is denied, the denial notice will
provide:
• the specific reason(s) for the denial, and,
if applicable, either the specific internal
rule, guideline, protocol or other similar
criterion (if any) relied upon in making
the denial, or a statement that the rule,
guideline, protocol or other similar
criterion that was relied upon in making
the denial and that a copy of such rule,
guideline, protocol or other similar
criterion will be provided free of charge
upon request
• references to the part of the Plan on
which the denial is based
• a statement that you are entitled to
receive, upon request and free of charge,
reasonable access to, and copies of, all
documents, records, and other
information relevant to your Claim for
benefits;
• a statement of your right to bring an
action under Section 502(a) of ERISA
after the exhaustion of the Plan’s appeal
procedures
• if the denial is based on a medical
necessity or experimental treatment or
similar exclusion or limit, an explanation
of the scientific or clinical judgment for
such denial that applies the terms of the
Plan to your medical circumstances, or a
statement that such explanation will be
provided free of charge upon request
• for the initial appeal of Post-service
Claims only, appropriate information as
to the steps to be taken if you desire to
appeal the Plan Review’s determination
to the Plan’s Appeals Committee,
including notice of applicable time limits.
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Appeals Committee. While your claim is on
appeal to the Plan’s Appeals Committee,
you have the same rights you had during the
first appeal.
• This includes the right to have a
person, other than the person (or that
person’s assistant) who reviewed the
initial claim or the first appeal, make a
determination on your latest appeal.
• You have a right to a review by the
Plan’s Appeals Committee that does not
defer to any earlier determinations.
• If your request involves a medical
judgment, the Plan’s Appeals
Committee will consult health care
professionals who were not previously
consulted.
You will be notified of the Plan’s Appeals
Committee’s decision within a reasonable
period of time, but no later than 30 days
after the appeal was received.
If your claim is denied, the denial notice
will provide you with the information
described below.
• The denial notice will inform you of
the specific reasons for the denial. If
applicable, the denial notice will either
include the rule or protocol on which the
denial is based, or it will state that the
rule or protocol used to make the
decision will be provided free of charge
if requested.
• The denial notice will refer you to the
part of the Plan on which the denial is
based.
• The denial notice will state that you
have the right to reasonable access to
and copies of all documents and other
information regarding your claim free of
charge if requested.
• The denial notice will include a
statement of your right to sue under
Section 502(a) of ERISA after you have
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The Claims Administrator, the Medical
Director, the Plan’s Appeals Committee,
and/or their respective delegates shall have
absolute discretion in determining Claims for
benefits under the Plan.

done everything you can under the
Plan’s appeal procedures.
• The denial notice will tell you if the
denial is based on a determination that
the treatment is not medically necessary,
is experimental or falls under a similar
exclusion or limitation. The denial
notice will either explain the scientific
or clinical reasons for the denial,
applying the terms of the Plan to your
medical circumstances, or it will state
that an explanation will be provided free
of charge if requested.
• For initial appeals of Post-service
Claims only, the denial notice will tell
you the steps to take if you want to
appeal the Plan Review’s decision to the
Plan’s Appeals Committee and the
applicable time limits.
The Claims Administrator, the Medical
Director, the Plan’s Appeals Committee,
and/or their agents shall have absolute
discretion in determining claims for benefits
under the Plan.
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Claims Procedure Clause, Plan 2
Original

Redrafted

CLAIMS PROCEDURE

CLAIMS PROCEDURE

The following are the claims procedures for
the Plans. Absent a showing of irreparable
harm, you cannot bring a court action for
benefits under the plans until the claim
review process described below, including
all appeals, has been completed.

Claims Procedures for Medical,
Dental and Vision Plans

The following sections describe how to file a
claim so that the Plan covers, or pays for, the
care you receive. If your claim is denied, the
sections below will tell you how to appeal
the denial. Unless you can show that you
will suffer irreparable harm, you cannot file
a lawsuit against the Plan for benefits until
you have completed all the appeal
procedures described below.

If you believe that you are entitled to
benefits under the Medical, Dental or Vision
Plans, then you should submit your claim in
writing to the Claims Administrator for the
appropriate Plan, as identified on the page
with the heading "Claims Administrators".

Claims Procedures

For purposes of these claims procedures, the
following definitions will apply:

The following definitions apply to claims
procedures.

• A "post-service claim" is any claim for
a benefit that is not a pre-service claim.
• A "pre-service claim" is a claim for a
benefit with respect to which the terms of
the Plan condition receipt of the benefit,
in whole or in part, on approval of the
benefit in advance of obtaining medical
care.
• An "urgent care claim" is a claim
which, unless the special urgent care
deadlines are followed either (1) could
seriously jeopardize the patient's health
or ability to regain maximum function, or
(2) in the opinion of a physician with
knowledge of the patient's medical
condition, would subject the patient to
severe pain that cannot be adequately
managed without the care or treatment
requested in the claim. An individual
acting on behalf of the plan, applying the
judgment of a prudent layperson, can
determine whether the claim is an urgent

If you think that you are entitled to benefits
under the Plan, then you should submit your
claim in writing to the Claims Administrator.

• A "pre-service claim" is a claim for a
benefit that is filed before you receive
the benefit. The Plan will not pay for the
benefit unless the Plan has approved the
benefit before you receive it.
• A "post-service claim" is a claim for a
benefit that is filed after you have
received the benefit.
• An "urgent care claim" is a claim which
asks the Plan to treat the claim as an
emergency. There are two situations in
which a person should file an urgent care
claim. First, if the claim is not processed
more quickly than other types of claims,
the patient’s health or ability to make a
full recovery could be seriously
endangered. Second, a doctor believes
that if the claim is not processed more
quickly than other types of claims, the
patient would be subjected to severe pain
that cannot be managed without the
requested services. An individual who

care claim. However, if a physician with
knowledge of the patient's medical
condition determines that the claim
involves urgent care, it must be
considered an urgent care claim.
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makes decisions on behalf of the Plan
can determine whether the claim is an
urgent care claim by determining what a
reasonable person would decide.
However, if a doctor with knowledge of
the patient's medical condition decides
the patient needs urgent care, the Plan
must treat the claim as an urgent care
claim.

For urgent care claims and pre-service
claims, the appropriate Claims Administrator
will provide written or electronic notice to
you of its benefit determination (whether
adverse or not) within the following time
Initial Claims Decisions
frames:
For urgent care claims and pre-service
• 72 hours after receipt of an urgent care claims, a Claims Administrator will provide
claim (a decision can be provided to you you with written or electronic (i.e., through
verbally, as long as written or electronic e-mail) notice of its benefit decision within
the time frames described below.
notification is provided to you within
three days after the verbal notification)
• If you file an urgent care claim, the
• 15 days after receipt of a pre-service
claim.
For post-service claims, the Claims
Administrator will provide you with written
or electronic notice of any denial of your
claim within 30 days after receipt of the
claim. Regardless of the type of claim, you
will receive written or electronic notification
of any claim denial that includes:
• The specific reason(s) for the denial.

Claims Administrator can notify you
verbally of the Plan’s decision within 72
hours after the claim was received, as
long as you receive written or electronic
notification no more than three days
later.
• If you file a pre-service claim, the
Claims Administrator will notify you of
the Plan’s decision within 15 days after
the claim was received.

For post-service claims, a Claims
Administrator will provide you with written
or electronic notice of any denial of your
claim within 30 days after the claim was
• A description of any additional material received.
or information needed to support your
For all types of claims, you will receive
claim and an explanation of why such
written or electronic notification of any
material or information is necessary.
claim denial. The claim denial letter will:
• A description of the Plan's claim review
• inform you of the specific reasons for
procedure and the time limits applicable
the denial;
to such procedure (including information
about your right to bring a civil action
• refer you to the specific Plan sections
on which the denial is based;
under section 502(a) of ERISA following
an adverse benefit determination review).
• describe any additional information that
• References to the pertinent Plan
provisions on which the decision is
based.

• Reference to any internal rule,
guideline or protocol relied upon in
making the decision.
• If the claim denial is based on a

is needed to support your claim and will
explain why the information is needed;
• describe the Plan's claim review
procedure and the applicable time limits.
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medical necessity or experimental
treatment or similar exclusion or limit,
either an explanation of the scientific or
clinical judgment for the adverse
determination, applying the terms of the
plan to your medical circumstances, or a
statement that such explanation will be
provided free of charge upon request.
• If the claim denial concerns an urgent
care claim, a description of the expedited
review process applicable to the claim.
For urgent care and pre-service claims, if
you fail to provide the Claims Administrator
with sufficient information to determine
whether, or to what extent, benefits are
covered or payable under the plan, or if you
fail to follow the Plan's procedures for filing
such claims, the Claims Administrator must
notify you within 24 hours of receiving your
urgent care claim or within 5 days of
receiving your pre-service claim of the
specific information needed to complete the
claim. Notification may be verbal, unless
you request written notification. In the case
of an urgent care claim, you then have 48
hours to provide the information needed to
process the claim. You will be notified of a
determination on your urgent care claim no
later than 48 hours after the earlier of:
• The Claims Administrator's receipt of
the requested information; or
• The end of the 48-hour period within
which you were to provide the additional
information.
For pre- and post-service claims, a I5-day
extension of the time period for deciding
claims may be allowed, provided that the
Claims Administrator determines that the
extension is necessary due to matters beyond
its control. If such an extension is necessary,
the Claims Administrator must notify you
before the end of the 15- or 30-day period of
the reason(s) requiring the extension and the
date it expects to provide a decision on your
claim. If such an extension is necessary due

• include information about your right to
sue under Section 502(a) of the
Employee Retirement Income Securities
Act (ERISA) if the Claims Administrator
reviews your appeal of denied benefits
and again denies your claim;
• refer you to any internal rule or
protocol used in making the decision;
and
• describe the fastest appeal process
available if the claim denial is for an
urgent care claim.
In some cases the denial is based on a
determination that the treatment is not
medically necessary, is experimental or falls
under a similar exclusion or limitation. In
such cases, the denial letter will either
explain the scientific or clinical reasons for
the denial, applying the terms of the Plan to
your circumstances, or it will state that an
explanation will be provided free of charge if
requested.
For urgent care and pre-service claims, if
you do not give the Claims Administrator
enough information to determine which of
the services you received are covered by the
Plan or if you do not correctly follow the
Plan’s procedures for filing such claims, the
Claims Administrator must tell you what
information is needed to complete your
claim. The Claims Administrator must notify
you within 24 hours after receiving an urgent
care claim or within 5 days after receiving a
pre-service claim. The Claims
Administrator may only notify you verbally,
unless you request written notification. In the
case of an urgent care claim, you then have
48 hours to provide the information needed
to process the claim. If you provide the
requested information, you will be notified
of the Claims Administrator’s decision about
your urgent care claim within 48 hours after
the Claims Administrator received the
requested information. If you do not provide
the requested information in time, you will

to your failure to submit the information
necessary to decide the claim, the notice of
extension must also specifically describe the
required information. You then have 45 days
to provide the information needed to process
your claim. For pre-service claims, the
Claims Administrator must notify you
regardless of whether the claim is denied or
approved. For post-service claims, the
Claims Administrator must notify you only
if the claim is denied. If you do not provide
the required information within the 45-day
period, your claim may be denied.
If an extension is necessary for pre- and
post-service claims due to your failure to
submit necessary information, the Plan's
time frame for making a benefit
determination is stopped from the date the
Claims Administrator sends you an
extension notification until the date you
respond to the request for additional
information. If your claim is denied, you or
your representative may appeal the decision.
Your written request for review or reconsideration must be made in writing to the
address indicated in the claim denial letter
within 180 days after you receive notice of a
claim denial. As part of your appeal, you
have the right to:
• Submit written comments, documents,
records and other information relating to
your claim for benefits that you wish to
have considered.
• Request, free of charge, reasonable
access to, and copies of, all documents,
records and other information relevant to
your claim for benefits.
• A review that takes into account all
comments, documents, records and other
information submitted by you related to
the claim, regardless of whether the
information was submitted or considered
in the initial benefit determination.
• A review that does not defer to the
initial claim determination and that is
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be notified of the Claims Administrator’s
decision within 48 hours after the 48-hour
period you had to provide the requested
information.
For pre- and post-service claims, the Claims
Administrator may determine that a 15-day
extension of the time period for deciding
claims is necessary due to matters beyond
the Claims Administrator’s control. If an
extension is needed, the Claims
Administrator must notify you before the
end of the 15- or 30-day period. The notice
will inform you of the reasons for the
extension and the date the Claims
Administrator expects to provide a decision
about your claim. If the Claims
Administrator needs more information from
you in order to make a decision, the notice of
extension must also specifically describe the
required information. After the Claims
Administrator tells you what information is
missing, you have 45 days to provide the
requested information. For pre-service
claims, the Claims Administrator must notify
you regardless of whether the claim is denied
or approved. For post-service claims, the
Claims Administrator must notify you only
if the claim is denied. If you do not provide
the required information within the 45-day
period, your claim may be denied.
If an extension is needed for pre- and postservice claims because you did not submit all
the necessary information, the Plan’s time
frame for making a benefit decision is
stopped from the date the Claims
Administrator sends you an extension
notification until the date you respond to the
request for additional information. If your
claim is denied, you may appeal the
decision. Your written request for
reconsideration must be made in writing to
the address in the claim denial letter within
180 days after you receive notice of the
claim denial.
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conducted by someone other than the
individual who made the adverse
determination, and who is not such
person's subordinate.
• In cases where the claim denial was
based in whole or in part on medical
judgment, require the individual
reviewing the appeal to consult with a
health care professional who has
appropriate training and experience in
the field of medicine involved in the
medical judgment, who was not
consulted in connection with the initial
claim determination, and who is not such
person's subordinate.
• The identification of medical or
vocational experts whose advice was
obtained in connection with benefit
determination, regardless of whether the
advice was relied upon in making the
decision.
• In the case of a claim for urgent care,
an expedited review process in which
you may submit a request (verbally or in
writing) for an expedited appeal of a
denied urgent care claim and where all
necessary information, including the
plan's benefit determination on review,
will be transmitted between the Plan and
you by telephone, facsimile or other
available similarly prompt method.
Ordinarily, a decision on an appeal will be
reached within:
• 72 hours after receipt of your appeal of
an urgent care claim
• 30 days after receipt of your appeal of a
pre-service claim
• 60 days after receipt of your appeal of a
post-service claim
You will be provided with written or
electronic notification if your appeal is
denied. Such notification will include:
• The specific reason(s) for the denial.

Appealing Claims Decisions
If you request that the Plan review its
decision, you have the rights described
below.
• You have the right to submit written
comments, documents and other
information relating to your claim that
you wish the Plan to consider.
• You have the right to reasonable access
to copies of all documents and other
information regarding your claim free of
charge if requested.
• The Plan’s review must take into
account all the materials relating to your
claim that you submitted, even if the
materials have already been submitted or
considered during the initial benefit
decision.
• The Plan’s review must not defer to the
initial benefit decision. The Plan’s
review must be conducted by someone
other than the individual who made the
initial benefit decision or that person’s
assistant.
• If the claim is based on a medical
judgment, the individual reviewing the
appeal must consult a health care
professional who has the appropriate
training in the field of medicine
involved. The health care professional
that is consulted cannot be an individual
who was consulted during the initial
benefit decision or that person’s
assistant.
• You have the right to the identification
of the medical or vocational experts
whose advice was obtained by the Plan
in connection with your benefit decision.
You have this right whether or not the
advice was actually used in making the
decision.
• In the case of an urgent care claim, you
have the right to a faster review process.

• References to the pertinent Plan
provisions on which the denial is based.
• Reference to any internal rule,
guideline or protocol relied upon in
making the decision.
• If the claim denial is based on a
medical necessity or experimental
treatment or similar exclusion or limit,
either an explanation of the scientific or
clinical judgment for the adverse
determination, applying the terms of the
Plan to your medical circumstances, or a
statement that such explanation will be
provided free of charge upon request.
• Information concerning your right to
receive, upon request and free of charge,
reasonable access to, and copies of, all
documents, records and other
information relevant to your claim.
• Information concerning your right to
bring a civil action for benefits under
section 502(a) of ERISA with respect to
your claim.
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You may submit a verbal or written
request for a faster appeal of a denied
urgent care claim. In this case, all
necessary information will be
communicated between you and the Plan
by telephone, fax machine or another fast
method. This includes information
regarding the benefit decision under
review.
Ordinarily, a decision on an appeal will be
reached within:
• 72 hours after receipt of your appeal of
an urgent care claim
• 30 days after receipt of your appeal of a
pre-service claim
• 60 days after receipt of your appeal of a
post-service claim
If your appeal is denied, you will receive
written or electronic notification. The appeal
denial letter will:
• inform you of the specific reasons for
the denial;
• refer you to the specific Plan sections
on which the denial is based;

Claims Procedures Regarding
Coverage Eligibility

• refer you to any internal rule or
protocol used in making the decision;

If you are told that you are not eligible for
coverage under any of the welfare plans or
programs listed above, but you believe that
you should be eligible, then you should
request an eligibility claim initiation form
from the Benefits Service Center. The claim
must be submitted in writing to the address
shown on the claim initiation form.

• state that you have the right to
reasonable access to and copies of all
documents and other information
regarding your claim free of charge if
requested; and

Concurrent Care Claims
If the plan has approved an ongoing course
of treatment to be provided over a period of
time or a number of treatments, any
reduction or termination by the Plan of such
course of treatment (other than by the Plan
amendment or termination) before the end of

• include information concerning your
right to sue under Section 502(a) of
ERISA with respect to your claim.
In some cases, the denial is based on a
determination that the treatment is not
medically necessary, is experimental or falls
under a similar exclusion or limitation. In
such cases, the appeal denial letter will either
explain the scientific or clinical reasons for
the denial, applying the terms of the Plan to
your circumstances, or it will state that an

such period of time or number of treatments
shall be treated as a claim denial. The Claims
Administrator shall notify you of the claim
denial sufficiently in advance of the
reduction or termination to allow you to
appeal the denial and obtain a determination
on review of that denial before the benefit is
reduced or terminated. Any request by you
to extend the course of treatment beyond the
period of time or number of treatments
previously approved that is an urgent care
claim shall be decided as soon as possible,
but not later than 24 hours after receipt of the
claim by the Claims Administrator, provided
that such claim is made at least 24 hours
prior to the expiration of the prescribed
period of time or number of treatments.
This provision only applies to a failure that
(1) is a communication by you or an
authorized representative that is received by
a person or organizational unit customarily
responsible for handling benefit matters, and
(2) is a communication that names you, a
specific medical condition or symptom, and
a specific treatment, service or product for
which approval is requested.
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explanation will be provided free of charge if
requested.

Requests for More Treatment
If you have already received approval to
receive a certain number of treatments or to
receive treatment for a certain length of time,
any reduction in your treatment (other than
by Plan amendment or termination) is
considered a claim denial. The Claims
Administrator will notify you of the claim
denial in time for you to appeal the decision
and hear back before the reduction takes
place. For an urgent care claim, if you
request more treatment than the amount of
treatment already approved, your claim will
be decided as soon as possible. The decision
will be made no later than 24 hours after the
claim was received, as long as you made the
claim at least 24 hours before the approved
treatment expired.
This only applies if (1) the person or division
customarily responsible for handling benefit
matters receives a communication from you
or your agent, and (2) the communication
names you, your specific medical condition,
and the specific service or product you want
approved.

Claims Procedures for Plan
Eligibility
If you are told that you are not eligible to
participate in the Plan, but you believe that
you are eligible, you should request an
“Eligibility Claim Initiation Form” from the
Benefits Service Center. The claim must be
submitted in writing to the address shown on
the claim initiation form.
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Appendix C: Comprehension Test
The following questions concern the Health Plan you just read. Please select the best answer
from the available choices.
Medical Necessity Clause, Declarative Questions
Will the Health Plan cover benefits it does not consider medically necessary?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Do benefits for Temporomandibular Joint Disorder (TMJ) have to be medically necessary to
be covered?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
If two different treatments are expected to have the same outcome, will the treatment that is
more convenient to the patient be provided?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Is a treatment that will positively impact a patient’s medical condition considered medically
necessary?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
If the same care cannot be provided as safely in an outpatient setting as in an inpatient
setting, is the inpatient care considered medically necessary?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Is treatment that is ordered and approved by a licensed physician covered by the Health
Plan?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Does the physician treating the patient have a say in what treatment is considered medically
necessary?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
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Medical Necessity Clause, Procedural Questions
A patient complains to her doctor that she has a headache. The doctor orders a battery of
tests. Is the Health Plan likely to cover the scan?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
An expectant mother needs a cesarean section (C-section). Can the Health Plan determine a
96-hour hospital stay is not medically necessary and therefore is not covered?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
If a doctor botches a patient’s nose job, can the patient’s treatment to fix her nose be covered
by the Health Plan?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
If a patient’s doctor believes a kidney transplant is medically necessary to address his kidney
failure, will the Health Plan cover the treatment?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
If a patient has a terminal cancer and has exhausted all the traditional treatments that are
available, will the Health Plan cover an experimental treatment?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
A young child is hit by a car and taken to the emergency room. Will the hospital care be
covered if the same care could have been provided in a pediatrician’s office?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Bypass surgery is a standard treatment for clogged arteries. If a patient has clogged arteries,
can the Health Plan refuse to cover bypass surgery?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
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Claims Procedure Clause, Declarative Questions
Is a pre-service claim filed after the Health Plan has denied coverage but before treatment
has been received?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
When reviewing a benefit denial, can the Health Plan take the initial decision to deny
coverage into account?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Is an urgent care claim only appropriate when the patient’s health could be seriously
endangered unless treated quickly?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Does Section 502(a) of ERISA give you a right to sue the Health Plan for denied coverage?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
If the Health Plan denies coverage for a requested treatment based on a determination that
the treatment is not medically necessary, does the Health Plan choose which medical
professionals review the Plan’s decision?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Can the individual who reviews a denial of coverage be the same individual who made the
initial benefit decision?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Do patients have the right to know who gave professional advice to the Plan in regard to
their claim?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
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If a patient does not include all the necessary information in his/her claim, will the
Health Plan first deny the claim and then give the patient a chance to reverse this decision?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
If a patient does not include all the necessary information for a post-service claim, can the
Health Plan wait 45 days to notify the patient of its decision?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
Claims Procedure Clause, Procedural Questions
A patient files a post-service claim for X-rays. The post-service claim is denied. If the
patient decides to appeal the denial, can she submit a note from the doctor who treated her
that says the doctor thought the care was medically necessary?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
A patient finds a suspicious mole on his arm that he has the doctor check. The doctor tells
him that the mole is dangerous and should be removed. He files a claim with the Health Plan
for coverage but his claim is denied. He wants to sue the Health Plan for coverage. Should
his first step be filing a request with the Health Plan to review its decision?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
A Plan member’s son needs surgery. The Plan member files an urgent care claim. The
Claims Administrator calls the Plan member later that same day and tells her that she forgot
to include her son’s social security number in the paperwork, which is necessary for the
claim to be approved. Does the Plan member have to provide the requested information
within 48 hours for the Health Plan to make a decision?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
A patient requests that the Health Plan review its decision to deny coverage for back
surgery. In the claim denial letter, the Plan states that the coverage was denied based on a
lack of medical necessity. Can the Plan member get more specific information about the
reason for the denial?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
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While exercising two months ago, a patient damaged some tendons in his ankle. He filed
a pre-service claim for physical therapy treatment and was approved to attend 24 physical
therapy sessions to treat the injury. He has already attended 12 sessions and his ankle is
starting to feel better. He receives notification that the Health Plan has decided to reduce his
approved treatment to 15 sessions. Is he most likely to get coverage for all 24 sessions if he
keeps going to the remaining 12 sessions he was originally approved for and then files a
post-service claim?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
The Health Plan denies coverage for a Plan member’s knee surgery. The Plan member is not
satisfied with the Health Plan’s decision. Does the Plan member have to appeal the decision
to the Health Plan before filing a lawsuit against the Health Plan?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
A patient needs a kidney transplant. The transplant was scheduled for 3 days from now, but
the date has been set back to 10 days from now. The patient needs kidney dialysis in the
meantime to stay alive. The patient has been approved under an urgent care claim to receive
dialysis for 3 days. Now, the patient needs dialysis for 7 additional days so she files an
urgent care claim request for more treatment. If the patient calls the Claims Administrator,
does the Claims Administrator have to notify her of the Health Plan’s decision immediately?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
A patient needs a skin graft. Can the Claims Administrator extend the deadline for making a
claims decision if the patient did not provide her doctor’s name on the pre-service claim
form?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
A patient snores loudly at night. His doctor tells him a tonsillectomy will reduce his snoring.
He files a pre-service claim for treatment and is denied. He calls the Claims Administrator,
requesting an appeal of the decision. If he tells the Claims Administrator all the information
the Health Plan needs to process his appeal, has he followed the proper appeal procedure?
A. Yes
B. No
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question
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Appendix D: Short Test of Functional Health Literacy in Adults

Here are some medical instructions that you or anybody might see around a
hospital. These instructions are in sentences and have some of the words
missing. Where a word is missing, a blank line is drawn, and 4 possible
words that could go in the blank appear just below it. I want you to figure
out which of those 4 words should go in the blank, which word makes the
sentence make sense. When you think you know which one it is, pick that
choice and go on to the next blank.
PASSAGE A: X-RAY PREPARATION
Your doctor has sent you to have a ____________ X-ray.
stomach
diabetes
stitches
germs

You must have an __________ stomach when you come for __________.
asthma
is.
empty
am.
incest
if.
anemia
it.

The X-ray will ____________ from 1 to 3 ____________ to do.
take
beds
view
brains
talk
hours
look
diets
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THE DAY BEFORE THE X-RAY.
For supper have only a ____________ snack of fruit, ____________ and
jelly, with coffee or tea. little
toes
broth
throat
attack
toast
nausea
thigh

After ____________, you must not ____________ or drink anything at
minute,
easy
midnight,
ate
during,
drank
before,
eat
____________ until after you have ____________ the X-ray.
ill
are
all
has
each
had
any
was

THE DAY OF THE X-RAY.
Do not eat ____________.
appointment
walk-in
breakfast
clinic

Do not ____________, even ____________.
drive,
heart.
drink,
breath.
dress,
water.
dose,
cancer.
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If you have any ___________, call the X-ray ____________ at 616-4500.
answers,
Department
exercises,
Sprain
tracts,
Pharmacy
questions,
Toothache

PASSAGE B: MEDICAID RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
I agree to give correct information to __________ if I can receive Medicaid.
hair
salt
see
ache
I ____________ to provide the county information to ____________ any
agree
hide
probe
risk
send
discharge
gain
prove
statements given in this ____________ and hereby give permission to the
emphysema
application
gallbladder
relationship
____________ to get such proof. I ____________ that for Medicaid I must
report
inflammation
investigate
religion
entertain
iron
understand
county
establish
any ____________ in my circumstances within ____________ (10) days of
changes
three
hormones
one
antacids
five
charges
ten
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becoming _________ of the change. I understand __________ if I DO NOT
award
thus
aware
this
away
that
await
than
like the ____________ made on my case, I have the ____________ to a fair
marital
bright
occupation
left
adult
wrong
decision
right
hearing. I can _________ a hearing by writing or __________ the county
request
counting
refuse
reading
fail
calling
mend
smelling
where I applied. If you __________ TANF for any family __________, you
wash
member,
want
history,
cover
weight,
tape
seatbelt,
will have to ________ a different application form. ____________, we will
relax
Since,
break
Whether,
inhale
However,
sign
Because,
use the ____________ on this form to determine your ____________.
lung
hypoglycemia.
date
eligibility.
meal
osteoporosis.
pelvic
schizophrenia.
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Appendix E: Benefit Denial Letters
Now imagine that you are a member of the Health Plan you read. You have been seeing
your doctor about varicose veins that you have in your legs. Varicose veins are enlarged
veins commonly found close to the skin's surface. You and your doctor think you should
have the veins removed because they have made walking and exercise painful (strong
claim)/they are visibly unattractive and occasionally painful (weak claim). You filed a
pre-service claim. The following letter is the Health Plan’s response to your request.
First Benefit Denial Letter
Dear Plan Member:
Your request for coverage for the surgical removal of varicose veins that have made
walking and exercise painful (strong claim)/that are visibly unattractive and occasionally
painful (weak claim) has been reviewed by our Claim Administrator and denied by the
Health Plan for the following reason: Request for surgery has been denied due to lack of
medical necessity for the procedure requested.
You have the right to appeal our decision. The appeal must be in writing and it should
include the complete medical record and identify issues you wish us to consider.
We have advised your doctor that financial liability for the above service is currently
entirely your responsibility.
If you have questions regarding the appeal procedure, please contact the Claims
Department.
Sincerely,
Diane Smith, R.N.
Claims Administrator
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The following letter is the Health Plan's response to your appeal.
Second Benefit Denial Letter
Dear Plan Member:
You have requested that the Health Plan reconsider its denial of your request for precertification for the surgical removal of varicose veins that have made walking and
exercise painful (strong claim)/that are visibly unattractive and occasionally painful
(weak claim). The Health Plan affirms its decision to deny coverage for the treatment
proposed.
In investigating your request, the Health Plan has (1) conducted a search of Medline (an
online database of journal articles about medicine), (2) reviewed the medical literature,
and (3) obtained opinions from two local board certified surgeons, Dr. William Tanner
and Dr. Carrie Johnson.
After obtaining this information, the Health Plan denies your claim for the following
reason: Request for surgery has been denied due to lack of medical necessity for the
procedure requested.
You have the right to challenge the Health Plan’s decision through a lawsuit, under
Section 502(a) of ERISA.
Sincerely,
Dan Munroe, M.D.
Medical Director
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Appendix F: Procedural Fairness and Plan Satisfaction Questions
Procedural Fairness
Based on how you feel at this point in the claims process, rate your agreement with the
following statements regarding the Health Plan you read about.
Control
Health Plan members get the information and education they need to participate
effectively in their care and treatment.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

The Health Plan has procedures that give members the chance to have their say regarding
the Health Plan.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

The Health Plan makes sure that members’ concerns are heard before claims decisions
are made.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

Neutrality
The procedures followed in the claims process favor members over the Health Plan.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

The procedures followed by the Health Plan in the claims process ensure that everyone is
treated fairly.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree
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The Health Plan collects accurate and complete information in order to make claims
decisions.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

Trust
The claims procedures used by the Health Plan protect members from unfair treatment.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

Overall, the Health Plan tries to handle members’ situations fairly.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

Social Standing
The Health Plan is respectful of its members.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

4

5
Strongly
Agree

The Health Plan is caring to its members.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

The Health Plan values what is best for each member.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree
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Plan Satisfaction
The procedures used to handle this claim were fair.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

The Health Plan provides adequate coverage to Plan members.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

The Health Plan gives too high a priority to holding down the cost of medical care instead
of providing the best medical care.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

4

5
Strongly
Agree

The Health Plan takes appeals seriously.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

If I were a member of this Health Plan, I would be satisfied with it.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Strongly
Agree

